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INTRODUCTION
Australia’s border is marked by extremes of incorporation and exclusion. Aus-tralia leads the world in cruelty to refugees. It is unique in mandatorily andindefinitely detaining asylum seekers (Menadue et al., 2011: 31). It locks up
refugees on remote islands in the Pacific, in conditions that amount to torture (Mendez,
2015: 9). These cramped, hot, and degrading camps have claimed nine lives since 2014.
That is not to speak of the rape of women, sexual assault of children, or the high in-
cidences of self-harm. Yet this sits side by side the mass inclusion of migrants. Aus-
tralia’s overseas-born population is among the highest in the world relative to popu-
lation (OECD, 2017). Permanent migration brings almost 200 000 migrants into the
workings of Australian capitalism each year. The stock of temporary migrants in Aus-
tralia meanwhile nears two million. There is a contradiction in the border—between
incorporation and exclusion.
For Marx (1976a: 103), “the movement of capitalist society is full of contradictions”.
At its base, capitalist social relations are founded on contradictions between use-vale
and exchange-value, capital and labour, wealth and value, public and private. He mocks
the attempts of bourgeois economists to “explain away the contradictions” (Marx, 1976a:
209). Ollman (2003: 84–5) suggests that contradictions are driven by five movements:
mutual support, mutual undermining, immanent unfolding, metamorphosis, and reso-
lution.
Incorporation and exclusion operate through these movements. They are mutually
supportive. Implicit to every included migrant, is the exclusion of unknown others
who failed to fit the hierarchy of eligibility. Likewise, exclusion is ever predicated on
incorporation—boatpeople are vilified for ‘sneaking’ through the ‘back door’ and not
entering ‘the right way’. But so too do they undermine one another. In attempting to
make visible the exclusion of refugees, politicians galvanise opposition to migration in
general. Likewise, the inclusion of migrants does not have the automatic effect of cre-
ating racism. Rather, the incorporation of migrants into workplaces holds the potential
1
INTRODUCTION
of interpersonal friendship and inter-racial solidarity. Understood as a contradiction,
incorporation and exclusion will not tend to cancel out one another, but rather imma-
nently unfold, increasing in volume and intensity. This description fits the Australian
border perfectly, with the contradiction unfolding necessarily in opposite directions—
towards the mass incorporation of almost two million temporary migrants, alongside
a refugee regime growing ever crueller. Capital’s requirement for skilled and unskilled
labour has been realised through modulations in the incorporation-exclusion relation.
Unfortunately for those under the border regime, any resolution of the border relation
seems all too far away.
This contradiction between incorporation and exclusion lies deep in the Australian
border. The reasons that Australia includes migrants has been relatively well theorised—
Australia gains when workers come to Australia. Neoclassical economists estimate a
world of open borders could precipitate increases to world GDP of 50—150 per cent
(Clemens, 2011: 84). Australia’s economy is buoyed by mass inclusion. What is less well
theorised is what explains the exclusion of migrants.
And Australia’s border is dripping with exclusion. The permanent migration pro-
gram is predicated on the exclusion of the ‘wrong’ migrants. Those that are incorpo-
rated into Australia still experience structural and interpersonal exclusion in the form
of racism. Temporary migrants are excluded from whole swathes of Australian life—
they may not vote, they are denied full working rights. Those that breach these con-
ditions face the threat of deportation. And no group is more viscerally excluded than
refugees, who are imprisoned in offshore prison camps on Pacific islands. Exclusion sat-
urates the border.
This thesis aims to address a question at the heart of the border: Why does the
Australian state close its borders to migrants whose labour could benefit capital? What
explains this exclusion so prominent across the border?
Framework
This thesis utilises a relational framework to understand the border. For Marx, cap-
ital is not “a thing, but a social relation between persons which is mediated through
things” (Marx, 1976a: 932). Poulantzas extends this, arguing the state is not an “intrin-
sic entity” but “rather a relationship of forces” (Poulantzas, 1978: 128–9). The two are
2
understood as relations inextricably bound together. This thesis conceptualises the bor-
der as a sub-relation within the state relation. It is thus not a fixed thing, but a social
relation that is constantly rendered “into seemingly fixed and stable thing-like realities
with a semblance of objectivity, durability and intrinsic power” (De Genova, 2016). In its
thing-like guise, the border appears as a line on a map delineating inside and outside.
Ostensibly, it merely lets in some, and blocks entry to others. However, understood as
relation, the border encompasses more than line.
Border-as-relation acts as filter, mould, and ideology. Borders do function as filters
at one level. There is, for example, a huge disparity between the border experience of a
United States businessman and a refugee. However, Anderson et al. (2009: 6) argue that
borders are “better analysed as moulds” than filters. People do not merely pass through
borders unaffected. Their relationship with others, with the state, and with capital are
fundamentally shaped in the process. Border regimes frequently impose conditions on
people making those crossings, for example with visa laws. Indeed, one doesn’t even
need to cross a border to have its impact felt. Refugees and would-be-migrants are
keenly aware of the difficulties and problems of border crossings well before they get
anywhere near them. Moreover, the ideological moment of the border shapes domes-
tic workers’ conception of themselves and the nation. This is affected by the border’s
concrete and rhetorical operation, which is often either implicitly or explicitly racially
discriminatory. The border has a key role in constructing the conception of national
divisions. To cite the Australian Border Force (ABF, 2017):
“We consider the border not to be a purely physical barrier separating nation
states, but a complex continuum stretching offshore and onshore, including
the overseas, maritime, physical border and domestic dimensions of the bor-
der.”
The border is more than just a membrane; it shapes migrants and ideologically con-
ditions all workers.
Border and capital are inextricably linked. This capital relation does not contain
within itself the conditions for its own reproduction. It requires the state to provide
education and healthcare, and it requires the gendered reproduction of workers in the
household. These necessary conditions for the reproduction of capitalism are not medi-
ated through the value form itself—through value valorising itself. Rather they exist
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as a basic meta-relation: capitalist production logically entails the reproductive frame-
works that uphold it. This meta-relation is reproduced with capitalism and sits at the
base of the social formation (Jessop, 2002: 16). This thesis suggests that the border
forms a key support for capital accumulation. But what role does the border play? What
does it support?
Thesis Structure
This thesis argues that at its deepest level, the Australian border’s dynamic of exclusion
is predicated on a racist division of the working class. It argues that the border relation
acts to secure consent, through a process of hegemony. The divisions of race and na-
tion are not timeless and automatic features of people’s consciousness. Rather, they are
continually produced and replicated with capital’s self-expansion. This thesis argues
that borders have a key role in rendering these divisions from theory to the “common
sense” of the working class (Gramsci, 1996: 433). By enacting divisions in the working
class, rhetorically and concretely, borders ensure that the global proletariat is divided
by nation. It makes this argument through four chapters.
Chapter one reviews the literature on Australia’s border, arguing that authors fail to
grasp the border’s contradiction between exclusion and incorporation. It considers the
attempts of conservative, liberal, pluralist and Marxist theorists to understand Aus-
tralia’s border. It posits that the literature has attempted to grasp the contradiction
either by one horn or neither, and thus struggles to explain the contradictory tenden-
cies of the border.
Chapter two advances a political economic approach that grasps the contradiction
across the border. It introduces three key themes of explanation in Marxist theorisa-
tions of borders: reserve army, superexploitation, and division. It argues that the three
explanations are mutually internal, but that at its deepest level, racial divisions precede
the significance of reserve army and superexploitation
Chapter three applies this to Australia’s refugee program, which provides a clear
example of the border’s ideological function in division. This chapter examines the main
pillars of refugee policy: mandatory detention, offshore processing, and militarised na-
tionalism. It argues that the rhetorical focus of refugee policy has been domestic rather
than foreign, that the continual stream of anti-refugee sentiment has had a structural
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impact on class struggle, and that anti-refugee racism is related to anti-migrant racism
in general.
Chapter four uses the three explanations offered in chapter two as a lens to in-
vestigate the major features of Australia’s border: the permanent program, 457 visas,
international students, and working holiday makers. It argues that each component is
marked by the concrete and rhetorical division of workers. The Australian border di-
vides workers through a long process of producing ‘common sense’ racism. Secondly, it
argues that the operation of the border itself relies on the racism it helps produce.
This thesis concludes that Australia’s border is deeply characterised by racism,
which operates across the border. It notes that specific programs serve various func-
tions important to explaining them. But abstracting across the border relation as a
whole, racism is the key presupposition explaining the dynamics of inclusion and exclu-
sion. This underlying process is a powerful moment of the hegemony that secures for
capital the consent of labour.
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EXPLAINING AWAY THE CONTRADICTION:
THEORISING THE AUSTRALIAN BORDER
Colonial Australia’s border has been characterised by a deep contradiction for theduration of its existence. It has been defined by efforts to include new workers,but simultaneously denigrate a swathe of potential workers. Efforts to import
early workers coexisted with a brutal war against Australia’s First Peoples. Ruling class
fears of Asian invasion, embodied in the White Australia Policy (WAP), sat alongside
historically high immigration rates. Today, Australia has one of the world’s highest rel-
ative migrant intakes, and leads the world in anti-refugee brutality. But this chapter
argues this contradiction between inclusion and denigration has not been sufficiently
theorised.
This chapter surveys the literature attempting to explain the refugee and migration
programs, considering the major liberal, conservative, pluralist and Marxist accounts.
It argues that the prevailing literature has failed to grasp the contradiction as a whole.
First, it considers explanations of incorporation, which attribute its existence to respec-
tively: state, non-state, and economic motivations. Second, it examines explanations for
exclusion, considering racial, political, and departmental accounts. This chapter argues
that each approach attempts to evade the contradiction, and thus fails to comprehend
it in its entirety. This leads theorists to essentialise the phenomenon to some feature
or other, which fails to explain the structural production of countervailing tendencies
towards incorporation and exclusion.
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AUSTRALIAN BORDER
Theorising Incorporation
Attempts to theorise the border’s incorporative moment have failed to grasp the exclu-
sion inherent to it. The three main conceptions of incorporation are: state motivation,
non-state motivation, and economic motivation. Theorists who ascribe incorporation to
state motivation, divorced from economic motivation, are drawn to conspiratorial and
idealist accounts which fail to explain actual migration policy. Theorists who argue that
non-state actors have supplanted the state as determinants of border policy find lim-
ited empirical support for the position, and fail to theorise the state’s role in exclusion.
Theorists who place economic motivation as main driver of inclusion are led to posit
purely political motivations for border closure. This struggles to explain the continuity
and seemingly structural nature of exclusion. Each explanation fails to grasp the border
contradiction.
State Motivation: Essentialising Racism
Conservative accounts emphasise the exclusionary moment of the border, and fail to
theorise incorporation. In essentialising racism and cultural difference, they portray
the dynamic of incorporation as an end-in-itself, or attribute it to a purportedly powerful
‘ethnic lobby’. Conservative theorists argue for a reduction in the immigration program,
not simply because it is rational, but because it is democratic. Pro-immigration activists
are an “intelligentsia. . . anxious to distinguish themselves” from those of “working-
or lower-middle-class origins” (Betts, 1996: 14). Conservative theorists regard their re-
marks as representative of the silent majority of Australians—fondly called “lower-class
parochials” (Betts, 1999: 3). This is sometimes used to justify the inclusion of racist
proclamations. Blainey (1984: 14–6) writes:
“Slogans appeared in large letters on many walls in the older Australian
suburbs:
STOP THE ASIAN INVASION
ASIANS GO HOME
These warning signs were ignored in Canberra”
Racism is conceived as endemic to ordinary Australians, and conservative theorists
are cast as representing them.
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This theory struggles to describe increases in the migration program. Assuming Aus-
tralia is broadly democratic, large cuts to the immigration program become the “only
response possible” (R. Birrell & Betts, 1988: 264). Yet the immigration program con-
tinues to facilitate the incorporation of migrants in increasing numbers, despite the
purportedly ubiquitous anti-migrant sentiment of the working class.
Explanations of the tendency towards incorporation are heavily undertheorised, fre-
quently verging on the conspiratorial. Geoffrey Blainey’s (1984: 7) infamous condem-
nation of Australian multiculturalism typifies this, using an extended analogy of a “se-
cret room”, existing “[u]nknown to the public, unknown probably to the parliament”, in
which “are devised plans that run counter to the immigration principles announced to
parliament”. This invokes a quasi-conspiratorial conception of the real workings of im-
migration policy. Other accounts regard migration as end-in-itself. Immigration’s “eco-
nomic benefits” are portrayed as a façade disguising the “prime goal” of policymakers:
increasing the migrant intake (R. Birrell & Betts, 1988: 262) Policymakers attempt
to “mute” the democratic discussion of immigration and “defuse opposition” by cyni-
cally “recommending an economically oriented, nationalist program” (R. Birrell & Betts,
1988: 264).
The group behind this drive is purportedly a powerful ‘ethnic lobby’. The migration
program is “driven by ethnic lobbying rather than by rational analysis” (Betts, 2003:
174). A minority of influential “ethnic lobbyists” (Betts, 2003: 187), and “ethnic press
and politicians” (R. Birrell & Betts, 1988: 261) are said to have formed a powerful “al-
liance of academics and ethnics” and taken hold of policymakers (Blainey, 1984: 13).
The thesis that an ethnic lobby has been the primary driver is faulty. ‘Ethnic lobbies’
have “invariably” pushed for high family migration, and have typically been “apprehen-
sive” about increases to skilled migration (Stilwell, 1987: 49). But immigration policy
has moved from family reunion to an emphasis on skilled migration. Ethnic pressure
fails to predict actual migration policy trends.
Liberal theorists are often drawn to idealism, tending to essentialise state moti-
vations. Idealism conceives of the border as a consequence of the ideas of public offi-
cials, and politicians. Jupp (2007: 7) emphasises the extent to which immigration pol-
icy is “influenced by ideologies”. The spread of neo-classical economics in the 1980s-
90s “strongly influenced” Hawke-Keating era policy (Jupp, 1998: 164). While politicians
and economists were probably often educated and exposed to such ideas, this approach
has some limitations. Neoclassical economics has been existence since the 1930s (Wolff
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& Resnick, 2012: 53–4); its prominence in the immigration department requires fur-
ther explanation. Moreover, the policy prescriptions of neo-classical economics are for
increases and deregulation of the migration program. However, the actual changes of
the Hawke-Keating governments did not reflect this. As will be described in chapter
four, the policy was of a re-regulation of the migration program, with a plethora of
rules, visas, and points coming to further define entry. The Hawke-Keating era was also
characterised by large temporary cuts to the immigration program during recessions.
Though ideology may have been important, there is clearly more to be explained.
Non-state Motivation: W(h)ither the state
Some theorists place the dynamics of inclusion largely on the autonomous decision mak-
ing of migrants, their families, or cultural networks. They either fail to sufficiently con-
sider the actions of the state, or argue that it has lost prominence in migrant networks.
Such approaches fail to capture state exclusion of migrants.
Neo-classical and rational choice explanations of migration are neither prominent
nor successful in migration research. Some use individual factors to examine the deci-
sion making structures of some classes of migrants (Kline, 2003; Yang, 2007). However,
it does not serve very well as an explanation of systemic factors decisive in changing mi-
gration regimes. The characteristic ‘push-pull’ explanations tend to focus on individual
decision-making. These theories perform very poorly in predicting the actual decisions
made by migrants, which are heavily influenced by historical and communal connec-
tions (Castles, Haas, et al., 2014: 30–1). However, other decision-based approaches are
more popular.
Pluralist theorists disavow the possibility of a single coherent theoretical treatment
of migration (Portes, 1997: 810–2; Castles, 2007: 365–6). They argue that systemic
changes in migration regimes necessitates a focus on factors less centred about the
state. These various changes are grouped under an underlying trend of ‘globalisation’
(Castles, 1996; Castles et al., 1994). Castles et al. (2013: 116) claim that “employers,
markets, families and informal networks. . . may have as much influence as govern-
ments in shaping who moves, how and when”, questioning whether there exists a “large
pool of people with the requisite skills and labour market characteristics who want
to come to Australia, so that the Australian government and employers can pick and
choose” anymore. Castles (2013: 116) also claims that “new means of transport and
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communication make border control much more difficult” (see also Castles, Vasta, et al.,
2014: 116). These changes purportedly make the state less relevant.
However, the Australian state still plays the dominant role in much of the migra-
tion. Tightly regulated caps in the permanent migration program allow the state to de-
termine migrant numbers. The points system, which assesses eligibility for Australian
residency by scored criteria, allows the state to shape a selection of characteristics of
those coming to Australia, including English-speaking ability, age, and qualifications.
While various networks, markets, and individual decision-making clearly affects which
particular individuals go where, this does not change the fact that the state has a de-
cisive role in choosing how many people migrate, how they are assessed as eligible for
entry, the terms on which they come, and the visa conditions to which they are sub-
jected if they do come. The claim that the pool of migrants is dissipating is not well
evidenced. The state has not struggled to fill its migration quota yet. There is also little
evidence that technology is making it harder for states to control their borders. Indeed,
the immigration department is utilising new technology to make that control even more
extensive. Brennan (2007: 97) terms the system of computerised processing of migrants
an “electronic offshore border”. At the time of writing, the government announced a $10
million satellite program which aims to help detect asylum seeker boats (Borys, 2017).
Investigating the personal motivations of migrants is a limited approach. Particularly
in Australia, the state still plays the primary role in border control.
Economic Motivation: Bisecting the contradiction?
Many theorists see incorporation as a positive economic force. Yet they are still con-
fronted by the contradiction between incorporation and exclusion. Freeman (1995: 882)
notes the contradiction between increasing “conflicts over immigration” and “an expan-
sionary bias”. For Jupp (2007: 197), the expansion of migration and the policy of mul-
ticulturalism has been “driven with the brake on”. Tavan (2006: 8) argues there is “an
inherent paradox about Australian immigration policy”: the Howard government over-
saw both cruelty to refugees and mass increases in Asian migration. Liberal theorists
describe a dichotomy of motivations—positing an economic driver to increase immigra-
tion, and a political driver to decrease it. But this leads to further problems. If the
government wants to increase immigration, then it should be driven to limit its “social
costs” by discouraging racism (Walsh, 2011: 864). But instead it seems to cynically stoke
racism through its refugee program. Each year, and under each new government, policy
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is marked by mass inclusion, and cruelty to refugees. Liberal theorists cannot offer a
structural explanation for the continual production of this contradiction.
Marxists too have attempted to bisect the contradiction between incorporation and
exclusion. Seeing the economic benefits of incorporation, some portray anti-Asian racism
as contrary to the needs of Australian capital, necessitating a shift to anti-Islamic
racism. Bradley and Minns (2015: 130) argue that Howard’s attempt to tap the “rich
populist vein” of anti-Asian racism as Liberal leader in 1988 was thwarted for this
reason. They draw attention to the statements of key business groups such as the Con-
federation of Australian Industry, and interviews with Liberal MPs indicating Howards
immigration stance was the reason he lost the leadership (see Kelly, 2008: 425–8). Anti-
Islamic racism is thus a way to satisfy both the function of populist anti-immigration
rhetoric and the need to satisfy business interests. This, they argue, has led to the
widespread use of “dog-whistling” rhetoric: concealed racism masquerading as politi-
cally acceptable discourse (Bradley & Minns, 2015: 132).
This theory divides racism between the refugee and migration programs. Bradley
and Minns (2015) see racism as beneficial in the refugee program and harmful in the mi-
gration program. Therefore, harmful anti-Asian racism can be diverted into the refugee
program. However, this fails to take account of the exclusion in the migration sphere.
The rhetoric and practice of politicians still perpetuates anti-Asian racism in the migra-
tion program (e.g. P. C. Manning, 2004). For example, similar ‘dog-whistling’ rhetoric is
directed against temporary migrant workers, and permanent migrants. The tendency to
regard racism as discretely promulgated through the refugee program alone is not con-
vincing. Bradley and Minns (2015: 135) themselves note the “strong correlation between
anti-immigrant sentiment and opposition to asylum seekers”. Attempting to bisect ex-
clusion and incorporation fails to understand both.
Theorising Exclusion
Theorisations of the exclusionary moment of the border attempt to explain the processes
of racism, but often end up decontextualizing it, divorcing from the structures that cre-
ate it. The three main explanations of exclusion are: race, politics, and department.
Those who regard the exclusionary moment of the border as a result of race tend to
decontextualize the process of racism. They comprehend racism as static thing and fail
to grasp racism and the exclusion it purportedly explains. Theorists who regard exclu-
sion as result of political motive grasp the contradiction by the exclusionary horn. But
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they conceive of exclusion as a contingent and individual phenomenon, which struggles
to explain its predominance. Finally, those who regard exclusion as result of depart-
mental action tend to essentialise the exclusionary moment, and fail to capture the fact
that politicians rhetorically stoke racist sentiment. Each explanation is unsuccessful in
theorising the mutual internality of incorporation and exclusion.
Racial Motivation: rational and natural
One line of thought portrays racism as a rational, or semirational, response from work-
ers, since migration is said to run counter to their interests. Betts (1996: 19) argues
people are rationally “worried about job competition and about increasing levels of cul-
tural diversity”. Opposition to immigration is thus conceived as the rational response to
migration policy. Any changes in public opinion are “most[ly]” attributable to changes
in government policy (Betts, 2002: 26). Increases in anti-migrant sentiment come from
a policy that is letting in more and more ‘Asians’. Decreases in anti-migration senti-
ment is the exception to the rule which must be explained. Betts (2002) suggests that
these occurrences can mostly be explained by governments making conservative policy
prescriptions: restrictions of access to migrant welfare, decreases in family migration or
planning levels, and anti-multiculturalism. Such policies are seen to appease a popula-
tion that wishes to limit the excesses of migration.
Some pluralist and Marxist thinkers also regard racism as rational. For Collins
(2008: 252), while elites have been pro-immigration, the working class has “not been as
enthusiastic”. This situates racism as originating in the ideas of Australians. Williams
(2007: 10) suggests that since migrants increase unemployment, immigration is con-
trary to the interests of the working class. Zappala and Castles (1998: 274) construct
immigration policy as a result of “class conflict” between employers who wish to in-
crease immigration and unions who wish to decrease it. For Castles (1996: 41), workers
are “threatened” by immigration as it degrades their conditions. Thus anti-immigrant
sentiment has a “semirational genesis”, as employers bring in “cheaper and more abun-
dant labour” (Castles, 1990: 19). However, none provide evidence for their claims that
migration degrades the domestic working class. Castles et al. (1998: 55) even admit that
there is no evidence linking immigration to decreases in wages, conditions, or employ-
ment. On empirical grounds then, the ‘semirational’ opposition is recast as ‘irrational’.
Racism is not the sound response to immigration as ruling class assault, but rather
an instance of bourgeois hegemony, transmuting worries about wages, conditions, or
employment into fruitless intra-class division.
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A related line of reasoning regards racism as a natural, or automatic, response to
migration. Australians are said to “define themselves as members of a national com-
munity possessing identifiable and distinctive national traits” (R. Birrell & Betts, 1988:
265). Thus any “influx of Asians” inflames passions because they are “seen as mani-
festly different in race and culture” (R. Birrell & Betts, 1988: 265). Freeman, likewise,
argues that immigration naturally breeds its own opposition (Freeman, 1995: 886). For
Phillips and Spinks (2013a: 6), opposition to refugees is a natural result of increasing
numbers of refugee boats coming. Jupp (2007: 197) suggests that racism “reflect[s] the
upbringing and collective culture” of a generation that lived under White Australia, ar-
guing this undercurrent of “xenophobia, assimilationism and lack of tolerance” explains
the refugee program.
Understandings of racism as natural or rational struggle to explain actual trends
in racist sentiment. There is little evidence of correlation between people with high
immigrant contact and the reaction of racism (Dunn, 2003). The thesis that racism
is merely a generational issue doesn’t accord with the persistence of racism (Markus,
2016). Rather, racism ebbs and flows, often most influenced by media. Likewise, govern-
ment policy does not engender racism in the way conservative theorists suggest; anti-
immigrant rhetoric tends to inflame rather than quell public opposition. Betts admits
the theory is undermined by periods of high-immigration with little public backlash.
But she suggests in response that “many Australians may be unaware of the recent
increases in the intake” (Betts, 2002: 28). This caveat betrays a flaw in the conserva-
tive account of racism—Australians typically know very little about the intricacies of
Australia’s migration program. Anti-migrant sentiment is much more a function of me-
dia reporting on the issue, often dominated by political manoeuvring. Jupp (1995: 219)
notes that opposition to immigration is “hard to gauge because media coverage revives
the story from time to time and by doing so encourages public reaction otherwise remain
dormant”. Moreover, “public opinion polling does not show immigration to be a major
concern when media campaigns are in progress” (Jupp, 1995: 219). This undynamic con-
ception of racism fails to comprehend the varying prominence of racism. While there is
latent racism in Australian society, it forms a poor causal explanation for policy due to
the fact its prominence is linked with media presentations.
This de-contextualisation of racism from media and political sources is key. Media
sensationalism about migration is commonplace in Australia. Blainey (cited in Gardiner-
Garden, 1993: 17) describes one speech where he argued that Australia’s immigration
gives “preference to a tiny ethnic minority of its population”, that ‘Asians’ were taking
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jobs, and threatening Western values of democracy and freedom of speech (see Milne &
Shergold, 1984). After asking a firm to provide him with any clippings about the speech,
Blainey (1984: 27) received “so many clippings—a brown-paper package full of them ev-
ery few days—that I have given up hope of reading them all”. Anti-immigrant discourse
receives a disproportionate hearing in Australia’s media.
Betts (1999) doubts the significance of surveys and interviews about racism, with
people fearing the charge of ‘political incorrectness’ and thus feigning tolerance. The
“more anonymous setting of the telephone interview can make it easier to tell the truth”
(Betts, 1999: 114). But this ignores the fact that just as surveys and interviews intro-
duce bias, so do the normal media sources and social influences of everyday life. There
is nothing inherently natural about being asked in the home, in the company of your
television, radio, and newspaper. The idea that the individualised phone call represents
a freedom from bias is symbolic of the decontextualisation of racism in conservative
accounts of racism.
This presents a problem to conservative theorists—in the absence of ‘media sensa-
tions’ people are not sufficiently opposed to immigration. In response, Betts (1999: 101)
muses, “It is easy to implement unpopular policies if people do not know much about
them”. Betts makes clear the conservative theory of racism. When sensationalist me-
dia inflate the claims of conservative anti-immigrant sources, this elicits people’s true
feelings about immigration. If not, the government has made anti-immigrant policy
prescriptions. And if neither, then people are unaware of the actual policy. This expla-
nation appears to treat anti-immigrant sentiment as a foregone conclusion that must
be fit around any evidence, and struggles to explain policy.
Political Motivation: Isolated Cynicism
Liberal theorists frequently explain refugee policy as a result of cynical political oppor-
tunism. Freeman (1995: 886) argues that “during bad times [immigrants] are targeted
as scapegoats for conditions they may have no part in causing”. The creation of populist
fervour via border spectacles is “produced for domestic consumption” (Devetak, 2004:
105). Maley (2004: 161) argues Howard’s rhetoric and policy was “perfectly calculated
to play on” the fears of former One Nation voters after the 1998 Queensland election—
in which Pauline Hanson’s party surpassed expectations in receiving 22.7 per cent of
the vote, decreasing the primary vote for all the major parties (Newman, 1998). Mares
(2002: 160) interviews the then immigration minister, deducing cynicism on his part:
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“[Immigration Minister Philip Ruddock] says that his ultimate priority is the
offshore resettlement program, which he wants to protect at all costs. But if
this is true, his tactics are self-defeating. By vilifying boat people and other
asylum seekers who arrive in Australia unlawfully,. . . he scratches at the
wound exposed by Pauline Hanson, instead of applying a healing salve.”
Thus Mares (2002: 160) concludes that the minister for immigration is “one of the
government’s frontline players in the shabby politics of division”. Liberal theorists con-
vincingly identify political expediency is key explanations of refugee policy.
The factors that lead to this cynicism are generally understood not as structural,
but individual. The problem is “political leaders who are ice-cold, free of meaningful
values, and crave only power” (Maley, 2015: 86). Devetak (2004: 108) laments: if only
“the government decided to treat asylum-seekers as humanitarian concerns” the cru-
elty to refugees could have been avoided. This suggests, however, that refugee cruelty
is merely a contingent feature of Australian capitalism. This is hard to square with
the continuous stream of refugee cruelty for the period this thesis examines, including
under Prime Ministers whom purportedly aim to treat asylum-seekers humanely. This
suggests there may be structural factors that push politicians to anti-refugee measures.
It also leaves open the explanation of the “deeply rooted popular fears” that are ex-
ploited by politicians (Mares, 2002: 27). The constancy of refugee cruelty indicates that
liberal explanations of the refugee regime portray as contingent are incomplete.
Departmental Duty: Essentialising Exclusion
Conservative theorists typically regard Australia’s refugee regime to exist due to a le-
gitimate or commendable desire to control borders, to protect the Australian people, or
to protect asylum seekers. For Betts (2001), opposition to boatpeople is the deep-felt
and rational desire of ordinary Australians. Millbank (2010: 42) calls the 1951 Refugee
Convention the “root of the boat people problem”, as it legitimises the movement of boat-
people. This causes boatpeople to come to Australia, and thus Australia to be forced to
control them through expensive measures which would “be better spent helping home-
less people” (Millbank, 2010: 44). Even those critical of the refugee regime call for Aus-
tralia to “secure our borders decently” (Brennan, 2007: xi). Australia’s border controls
are natural, rational, and democratic.
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This theory runs into problems in describing the actual formation of the refugee
regime. Most refugees coming by boat to Australia are eventually resettled here, mean-
ing government policy does not actually prevent boatpeople reaching Australia. If pre-
vention is the goal, then policy is hard to explain. The “lack of a coherent rationale for
mandatory detention” (Brennan, 2007: 256), makes bipartisan support for such policies
difficult to fathom. Moreover, it struggles to explain government racism. Though Bren-
nan (2007: 289) is critical of the way governments use “community anxiety about border
protection as an excuse” for border policies, he does not include the ways in which that
anxiety is created or exacerbated by the selfsame government. Government rhetoric
does not merely follow public opposition to refugees; it also leads it.
Immigration department culture is sometimes cited as an explanation of refugee
policy (e.g. Maley, 2004: 161). Cronin (1993) suggests that a bureaucratic culture of con-
trol has arisen, that saw the immigration department drawn increasingly into conflict
with the judiciary. To prevent the possibilities of judicial challenge, the government has
“confined and constrained” the courts (Cronin, 1993: 104). This has subsequently eroded
rights and freedoms, including particularly those of refugees. This has some utility in
explaining government actions particularly in the late-1980s to early-1990s (see Chap-
ter Three). However, it does not fully capture the refugee regime. In particular, the racist
rhetoric of politicians that constantly escorts refugee cruelty is not explained. Cronin
(1993: 87) agrees, arguing that the fear and anxieties of the migration program must be
understood to explain the program. Her work is useful in describing the structures of
control within the immigration department. But to understand the refugee program as
a whole requires a theorisation of racism.
Pluralist theorists fail to apply insights about the structure of race to refugee policy.
Some pluralist theorists, including Ellie Vasta and Stephen Castles, have more thor-
oughly theorised racism in Australia. Castles et al. (2014: 142) note the importance of
“government policies and political leadership” in “shap[ing] public opinion”. Concentrat-
ing on everyday racism, they argue that the “anti-racism of official policies and public
rhetoric is often only skin-deep” (Castles & Vasta, 1996: 4), noting that it has not led to
reductions in the everyday racial abuse migrants experience (Castles, 1996: 43). This is
traced back to a lack of any “commitment to fundamental change” from the Australian
government (Castles & Vasta, 1996: 5). For Castles (1996: 44), racism cannot be seen as
“peripheral to capitalist society, and therefore excisable with out basic changes”. Rather,
racism is intertwined with nationalism—defined as the “constant process of asserting,
questioning, redefining and examining the national identity” (Castles, 1990: 6). Plural-
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ist theorists have developed tools to understand racism, but have failed to apply them.
This analysis of racism is not linked to refugee policy. Castles (2011: 317) notes the pos-
sibility that immigrants can act as “scapegoats” but does not link this to refugee policy.
Rather, policy and rhetoric is said to originate in refugees undermining “the tradition of
strict government control of entries” (Castles, Vasta, et al., 2014: 135). But this fails to
capture why politicians would stoke racist sentiment.
Marxists have sometimes gone to the other extreme—essentialising exclusion. Grew-
cock’s ‘Border Crimes’ is a detailed investigation of Australia’s refugee regime. Using a
broadly Gramscian criminological approach, Grewcock (2009: 214) theorises the abuse
and deaths of refugees not as the acts of “errant individuals” but as crimes attributable
to the Australian state. He situates the regime in a global system of “Western exclusion
zones”, under which border controls are militarised, refugees are demonised for failing
to fit into a schema of legitimacy, a calculated rhetorical and material war is waged on
people smuggling, and refugee mistreatment is deliberately fostered as a major domes-
tic political issue (Grewcock, 2009: 57). He contextualises popular support for border
controls and the abuse of refugees within a process of hegemony (Grewcock, 2009: 23–
4, 30). This shows how civil society is able to “[stabilise] and [protect] the state during
times of economic or social crisis” by diffusing ideas which perpetuate ruling class power
(Grewcock, 2009: 24). This is a crucial insight left behind by many theorists. However,
border-control and not racism is portrayed as the end goal.
Grewcock does not connect refugee policy to the production of racism. His tendency
is to paint the “main purpose” of refugee policy as to “deter and punish irregular travel
to Australia” (Grewcock, 2009: 72). This fails to explain why the government is driven
to punish refugees. What benefit do successive governments reap from such policies?
Moreover, it does not describe why politicians promulgate racism. Grewcock (2014a: 72)
muses that state rhetoric targeting people smuggling seems “pitched more at a domestic
audience than refugees in transit”. This hints at the gains that may be realised through
a harsh refugee program, but doesn’t link it to the refugee policy itself.
Conclusion
In attempting to theorise Australia’s migration and refugee program, theorists have
often proposed different theoretical frameworks for incorporation and exclusion. For
some, migration is economically motivated and the refugee program politically so. Some
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attribute anti-migrant sentiment to a decontextualized conception of racism as natural
and rational. Others decontextualise the immigration department, portraying immi-
gration increases as the result of a conspiratorial coalition of ethnics and academics, or
portraying refugee policy as result of a department purely anxious to control its borders
as an end in itself. Others still deny the significance of state action, and fail to compre-
hend the dynamics pushing towards either incorporation or exclusion. In each case, the
contradiction is not grasped by both horns. By essentialising either of the incorporative
or exclusionary moments, its internal opposite is downplayed.
This chapter has argued that incorporation and exclusion are mutually internal
poles of a contradiction, and must be understood as such. It established this by sur-
veying prominent explanations of the Australian border—conservative, liberal, plural-
ist and Marxist—and concluding that attempts to divide the contradiction were not
fruitful. Chapter two takes this insight forwards, proposing three interconnected expla-
nations of borders from a Marxist framework, which aim to grasp the contradiction by
both horns.
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BORDERS
Marx’s dialectical method allows us to grasp contradictions at their root. Ratherthan reducing contradictory dynamics to inert thing-like entities, dialecticalthinking “regards every historically developed form as being in a fluid state,
in motion, and therefore grasps its transient aspect as well” (Marx, 1976a: 103). It
avoids “static, partial, one-sided, and one-dimensional” understandings (Ollman, 2003:
4), moving past these appearances to the essence of contradiction: its underlying dy-
namics of motion. Chapter one argued that Australia’s border regime was defined by a
contradiction between incorporation and exclusion. It argued that theorists have failed
to grasp the border relation in its entirety, instead objectifying its various moments.
This chapter turns to Marxist attempts to theorise borders, which grasp the transient
and contradictory movement of the border.
It sets out three themes of Marxist approaches to the theorisation of borders. Racism
produced at the border is said to channel class antagonism into worker-worker struggle,
delivering a structural benefit to capital. Migrants are said to be ‘shamelessly’ super-
exploited, facing poor wages and conditions through the border’s production of limited
residence. And borders are said to act as a ‘lever’ preceding supply and demand to se-
cure a reserve army of labour for capital. This chapter uses a Marxist method to probe
the internal relations of these explanations, arguing that the racism presupposed by all
three explanations forms the underlying dynamic behind the border contradiction. It
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does so by moving through the three explanations in turn: racism, superexploitation,
and reserve army.
Racism and division
Border relations play a crucial ideological and political role. For Merrill (2011: 49–50),
the political theatrics of immigration law reform frequently have limited material im-
pact on capital in terms of the actual number of migrants or would-be-migrants effected.
Rather, theatrics serve a key politico-ideological function. Borders predicated on racial
discrimination are material conditions that underpin racism. This racism can be used to
drive wedges in the working class, channelling class rage away from capital and against
other workers.
On this account, borders function to alter more than just wage-levels, conditions,
or the numbers of workers. Marx (1870: 222) concedes in probably his most comprehen-
sive treatment of immigration—his correspondence with Meyer and Vogt—that “Ireland
constantly sends her own surplus to the English labour market, and thus forces down
wages and lowers the material and moral position of the English working class” (see
also D. L. Wilson, 2017). But for Marx, the most important feature of the undercutting
of domestic pay and conditions is that it drives a wedge in the working class, with En-
glish workers siding with English capitalists against the Irish worker. Thus, “all the
means at the disposal of the ruling classes” are dedicated to the continuation of this
artificial antagonism (Marx, 1870: 221). He even calls it the “secret of the impotence
of the English working class despite its organisation” (Marx, 1870: 221). This figures
too in Lenin’s (1963: 457) theory of imperialism, under which the “bourgeoisie incites
the workers of one nation against those of another in the endeavour to keep them dis-
united”. This places borders as a key conduit to the ideological function of division so
essential to the capital.
Racism is a key tool of this division. Racism is not theorised as a natural result of hu-
man differences but ideology historically specific to capitalism; “Racial differences are
invented” (Callinicos, 1993: 18). Race is a “social category, not a scientific one” (Malik,
1996: 121). Its existence is not biological but discursively and materially constructed
under capitalist society. For Hall (1986: 10), race and ethnicity are key elements in cap-
italist social formations. Though they are historically specific and not universal, they
are crucial political and ideological supports of the social division that upholds capital-
ist production. Merrill (2011) argues against economistic theories which treat race as
22
RACISM AND DIVISION
epiphenomenal.1 Racial identities are “in themselves material forces” fundamental to
creating the conditions of accumulation (Merrill, 2011: 1567).
Marxists have long recognised the crucial role race plays in securing capitalism. For
Cox (1959: xxx–xxxi):
“Racial antagonism is part and parcel of this class struggle, because it devel-
oped within the capitalist system as one of its fundamental traits. . . Proba-
bly one of the most persistent social illusions of modern times is that we have
race prejudice against other people because they are physically different—
that race prejudice is instinctive.”
Racial divisions cement the conditions of imperialism. They naturalise inter-country
disparities, dispossession and slavery. Moreover, racial division naturalises itself; work-
ers essentialise its thing-like form and the process of racism becomes the natural in-
stinct of the working class. Racism is a process of dividing workers.
For Callinicos, the border is one mode through which racial division can be ex-
pressed. The very “existence of a working class composed of ‘natives’ and immigrants. . .
makes possible the division of class on racial lines” (Callinicos, 1993: 34). This is up-
held via three mechanisms (Callinicos, 1993: 35–9). First, capitalism’s production of
economic competition between workers is liable to infusion with race. Competition be-
tween capitals, state policy and the bourgeois actions frequently pit workers against
each other, between skilled and unskilled, employed and unemployed, and so on. The
racialised nature of global and domestic capitalism means that these categories may
coincide with national origin or ‘ethnicity’. Secondly, domestic workers are made to feel
“a member of the ruling nation” and thus become “a tool of. . . aristocrats and capital-
ists” (Marx, 1870: 221). This process of nationalism binds domestic worker to domestic
capital. Finally, racism is constructed by capitalists and politicians particularly through
the media. Though sometimes deliberate, it need not be. These three mechanisms are
articulated through the border.
Racist division is also produced through the related ideology of nationalism. An-
derson’s (2006: 6) conception of nation as “imagined political community” reveals its
socially constructed nature. However, for Alonso (1994: 382), Anderson does not go far
1Though Merrill regards all Marxist theory as economistic.
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enough in explaining how the nation is embodied in “material practice”, or rendered
into “common sense”. The nation is not mere ideology but is materially embodied in
borders which reinforce these distinctions via the “socio-spatial segregation” of migrant
and citizen populations (Ferguson & McNally, 2014: 13). Likewise, the production of na-
tionalism is a continuing process of state formation. This “generates categories of Self
and Other within a polity” (Alonso, 1994: 391), which reinforces the formation of racism
at the national level. In conflating people, territory, and state, nationalism is a crucial
“form of consent generated by racialization” (Merrill, 2011: 1558). Hall (1986) suggests
that race and class are interlinked, with race a component of the social formation which
supports the capitalist mode of production.
Superexploitation and precarity
Migrant workers experience a particular form of exploitation. For Lenin (1963: 454),
“dire poverty” in migrants country of origin underlies the process of migration, with
capitalists implicated both in the production of imperialism and the exploitation of
migrant workers “in the most shameless manner”. Pröbsting (2015: 329) terms this
shamelessness “superexploitation”. Superexploitation occurs through the avoidance of
reproductive costs, low pay, and bad conditions. It is also said to be linked to the produc-
tion of “precariousness” (Bourdieu, 1998: 82). Precariousness describes the production
of migrant conditions that renders them more vulnerable to poor conditions and pay.
Pröbsting (2015: 330) argues that immigration constitutes a “value transfer” from
foreign to domestic capital. One substantial part of this is in the avoidance of the costs
of reproduction. There is a long history of capital shifting the costs of the social repro-
duction of labour-power away from itself, into the domestic sphere. Migration allows
domestic capital to avoid various costs of social reproduction (Pröbsting, 2015: 330–1).
Though these costs may be shifted over time between private and public sectors, or in
and out of the formal economy or domestic sphere, these costs are in the last instance
borne by capital. Migration can thus be a check on the tendency of Australian profit
rates to fall, by extracting not just surplus value from migrants, but by avoiding the
costs of the reproduction of workers.
The shamelessness of capitalist exploitation of migrant workers rears its head in low
wages and the frequent deprivation of rights (Lenin, 1964: 168). For Pröbsting (2015:
330–3), migrants are paid less than domestic workers, and given fewer rights. These
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disparities originate in a “condition of deportability”, whereby striking becomes diffi-
cult, sacking becomes easier, and wages are kept low (Ferguson & McNally, 2014: 6).
Limiting wages clearly increases profits. Migrants who are kept in a state of fear of de-
portation are far less likely to unionise, and more likely to accept bad conditions and
lower wages. Pröbsting (2015: 343) cites The Economist (2010): “Those dynamic enough
to hop between countries to find work are also the sort of people willing to change job,
take a pay cut or move home within a country in order to keep working. Such flexible
and productive labour is often just what flagging economies need”.
Superexploitation is said to rely on the production of migrant precarity. Précarité
has its roots in Bourdieu’s writings establishing ‘a new mode of dominance’ based on
the insecurity produced by globalisation and working class fragmentation (Shucksmith
& Brown, 2016: 668). This concept has been used by others to describe the position of
migrants in particular. For Anderson (2010), migrants’ specific experience of precarity
is central to their exploitation. Immigration controls are what produce the status of mi-
grants. They do this by creating categories into which migrants are sorted, by “mould-
ing. . . employment relations” and creating “legality and its obverse” (Bridget Anderson,
2010: 308–9). The conditions migrants face in the workplace and in society are largely
produced by the state. Standing (2011a: 105) goes further, arguing migrants form a
large part of a global precarious proletariat—"precariat”. Migrants frequently face un-
stable employment, and limitations on work rights and pay. He argues this constitutes
a new “dangerous class” (Standing, 2011a: 2, 147, 2011b).
Other theorists disavow this usage of ‘precarity’. For Jonna and Foster (2016), “the
term precariat is often no more than a fashionable and mistaken substitute for prole-
tariat itself. . . or else is employed to refer to a subcategory of the proletariat”. In the
first case, a false dichotomy is created between workers with stable employment and
migrants as victims of capitalism. In the second, the ability of migrant workers to chal-
lenge capital is cast as different from that of the working class. In this case, migrants’
precarious existence calls into question the stable link they have to production and thus
the power they hold. For Munck (2013: 759), the concept has a “family resemblance” to
the lumpen-proletariat “too strong to ignore”; precariat theory represents migrants as
a subproletarian workforce that lacks the tools, capacity and objective standpoint to
struggle against capital. Rather, for Seymour (2012), precarity is a constant and nec-
essary feature of the entire proletariat—migrant, temporary, or otherwise. But this
approach risks denying the particular experience of migrants under capitalism, and
erasing that struggle.
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An understanding of superexploitation must therefore mediate between the dual
ills of essentialisation and erasure. Migrants are not inherently docile, nor inherently
predisposed to worse conditions or pay. These are not characteristics of people from this
or that geographical area. And nor are the conditions they are exposed to identical to
those of a domestic worker, say. Rather, the living and working conditions that underpin
superexploitation are produced differentially between migrant and domestic workers,
via a process of racial division. It is this racism that underpins the production of the
state of superexploition. Understood thus, the debates of precarity are recast. Migrants
are of course differentially treated under capitalism; racism is constantly objectified into
concrete racial divisions in conditions and circumstance. But likewise, migrants are not
an objectively different class. It is only racism that makes it seem so. A theory that
fails to understand this grasps race only in its thing-like guise, ignoring its processual
nature. One must dialectically comprehend superexploitation’s predication on racism to
understand its basic workings.
Migration as Reserve Army
The concept of the reserve army is introduced in Engels’ (1845: 379–88) Condition of the
Working Class in England and Marx’s (1976b: 433) essay ‘Wages’ (see for discussion Hol-
lander, 2008: 218). Capitalism is marked by a perpetual oscillation between prosperity
and crisis (Engels, 1845: 383). Times of slump are followed by periods of overproduction.
This necessitates, for Engels (1845: 383–4), the existence of a reserve army, which can
be drawn into production during the “liveliest months”.
The reserve army has a dual role, also beneficial to the bourgeoisie during the times
of slump. It functions to increase the supply of labour-power relative to demand, which
acts to decrease the price of labour-power. Through this depression of wages, overpopu-
lation breeds profits. Engels (1845: 380–1) observes:
If a manufacturer can employ ten hands nine hours daily, he can employ nine
if each works ten hours, and the tenth goes hungry. And if a manufacturer
can force the nine hands to work an extra hour daily for the same wages by
threatening to discharge them at a time when the demand for hands is not
very great, he discharges the tenth and saves so much wages.
Marx (1976a: 784) argues migration is not merely a by-product of the cycles of booms
and bust, but that it becomes a “lever of capitalist accumulation”. In its role in producing
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the labour market, migration ensures any “absolute increase of capital is not accompa-
nied by a corresponding rise in the general demand for labour” (Marx, 1976a: 793). The
reserve army doesn’t just meet the labour requirements of capital in times of overpro-
duction, but floods the market. Far from mere reaction to it, the reserve army functions
as “the background against which the law of the demand and supply of labour does its
work” (Marx, 1976a: 790).
The reserve army serves a crucial ideological function. Its production produces in
turn an unnatural antagonism between workers, driving down wages and thus feed-
ing profits (Engels, 1845: 384). Through this antagonism, the reserve army pits worker
against worker and “rivets the worker to capital more firmly than the wedges of Hep-
haestus held Prometheus to the rock” (Marx, 1976a: 799).
Marx (1976a: 794) delineates three forms of the reserve army (or relative surplus
population): “floating”, “latent” and “stagnant”. The floating form consists of workers
who are thrown in and out of production along with the vagaries of accumulation. Marx
(1976a: 796) also identifies the “constant flow” of labour toward the centres of capitalist
production, which “presupposes. . . a constant latent surplus population” from which to
draw. This second ‘latent’ form refers to those not yet drawn into the centre of produc-
tion, but produced in such a condition that they can be pulled in. The final form is the
‘stagnant’ population which is a “part of the active labour army but with extremely ir-
regular employment” (Marx, 1976a: 796). It is characterised by “a maximum of working
time and a minimum of wages” (Marx, 1976a: 796). Outside of these main forms is the
“lowest sediment of the relative surplus population”, which consists of the lumpenpro-
letariat, orphan children, those unable and unwilling to work, and paupers awaiting
work (Marx, 1976a: 797).
Marx and Engels do not explicitly link the reserve army to migration. Engels (1845:
384) does note that “agricultural districts and branches least affected by the general
prosperity” may send their surplus labour to areas of high economic activity, even in-
cluding Ireland as a potential source in the German edition. He notes also that the
“rapid extension of English industry could not have taken place if England had not pos-
sessed in the numerous and impoverished population of Ireland a reserve at command”
(Engels, 1845: 389). But this is not theoretically developed.
Modern theorists have made the connection more explicitly (e.g.: Bridget Anderson,
2007; Everson, 2011; Ferguson & McNally, 2014; Merrill, 2011; Pröbsting, 2015). These
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theorists argue controlled migration can act as a reserve army lever, regulating the
levels of migration needed for national capital. Anderson (2007: 248) contends that mi-
gration acts as “a ‘tap’ that can be turned on and off”. Differential rates of immigration
can thus be targeted for different levels of economic activity, acting as one mode of the
reserve army.
The categories of reserve army can be applied to migration. The ‘latent’ army refers
in this context to potential migrants produced ‘outside’ Australia’s borders, whom can
be brought in via Australian migration policy to lever the forces of supply and demand
in the interests of capital. The ‘floating’ component is migrants pushed in and out of
employment. And the ‘stagnant’ component is employed migrants who experience vari-
able and ‘irregular’ wages, hours, and conditions—pushed easily into long hours, low
pay, and poor conditions.
Debates surge as to whether migrants constitute a reserve army. Birrell and Birrell
(1981: 278) argue the concept is totally inapplicable as there has been no deliberate
effort on the part of “policy-makers to ‘Asianize’ the intake” or consciously produce a
reserve army. For Lever-Tracy and Quinlan (1988), the latent reserve is the only ap-
plicable category of the three. To imply migrants are stagnant or floating layers is to
extend a false dichotomy between the workers who can fight capitalism, and the mi-
grants who are harmed by it. For Lever-Tracy (1981: 23), migrants are not a “reserve
army but. . . a possible potential vanguard”. Collins (1984: 62) disagrees, describing the
reserve army as “alive and kicking”.
The reserve army has two primary functions. First, a reserve army produces workers
to feed capital in times of expanded accumulation, beyond any “natural limits” (Marx,
1976a: 788). It is more than a force equating supply and demand, but rather a lever that
‘loads the die’ of market forces in favour of capital by artificially flooding or starving the
market (Marx, 1976a: 793). Second, it is used to drive down the wages and conditions of
the working class. This role can be subdivided into two parts. First, migrant workers are
forced into poor conditions that can purportedly be used to undercut domestic workers.
Second, a domestic working class resentful of this perceived fact become hostile to the
migrant workers.
These dynamics are liable to essentialisation. Migrants are only forced to accept poor
conditions due to the conditions of superexploitation. Migrant workers are no inherently
less militant than their domestic counterparts, as a long history of migrant militancy
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attests (Lever-Tracy & Quinlan, 1988). And superexploitation too must be understood
as predicated on the divisions of race. Likewise domestic hostility should not be treated
as natural. Collins (2008: 248) regards “social conflict” or electoral gains of the far right
to be the inevitable consequence of immigration. Migrants become “one of the major
reasons for a diffusion of class struggle” (Collins, 1978: 58). But to regard such diffusion
as inescapable is to misconstrue racism as object, and misconceive of it as peripheral
to or separate from the function of the reserve army. Rather, any hostility of domestic
workers towards migrants should be understood as product of the ideological processes
of division. In both of these senses, reserve army is predicated on the process of race.
Conclusion
In the Grundrisse, Marx (1993: 88–100) utilises a dialectical method to comprehend to-
tality. To understand the interconnectedness of the internally related moments of pro-
duction, distribution, exchange, and consumption, he shows that each of the categorises
are mutually presupposed. What is more difficult is to show how production “predomi-
nates” over both itself and the other categories (Marx, 1993: 99). It is difficult because
the structures of logical entailment generally run contrary to the structures of appear-
ance.
In the case of borders, appearances suggest that the border’s primary function is to
mediate for capital the number of workers. This is precisely the role of the border in
its objectified form—a membrane arbitrating entry. A further push into appearances
might reveal the border’s role in constricting and constructing entry. And further still
might reveal its ideological moment. But this chapter has argued that essences run
counter to appearances. Internal to the role borders have in mediating entry is their
role in constructing that entry through a contradictory movement of incorporation and
exclusion. And moreover, internal to the construction of entry are the divisions of race
needed to secure the racial divisions that superexploitation employs.
In theorising the border’s contradiction between incorporation and exclusion ex-
posed in chapter one, this chapter places racism at the core of the border, and at the
base of the social formation. But racism’s position in the social formation also points to
its contingency and historical specificity. Hall (1986) suggests therefore that the study
of racism’s role should also be historically specific, and not made to abstractly cover
all times and places. Griffiths (2004: 4, 2006, 2012) has analysed periods of Australian
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racism, arguing that racism in Australia has been shaped by three dynamics: the justi-
fication of “dispossession and genocide” of First Nations Australians to legitimise colo-
nial Australia, a ruling class “strategic fear” of mass Asian immigration, and a divide
and rule function. The border relation has developed alongside this, first imposing its
colonial existence, and then through the racially discriminatory White Australia Pol-
icy (WAP). But racism’s operation is historically contingent, and changes over time.
This analysis must also be carried out for contemporary forms of racism. Chapter three
thus turns to the cutting edge of Australian racism, disseminated through the border:
refugees.
30
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
3
AUSTRALIA’S REFUGEE PROGRAM: CYNICISM,
CONTINUITY, AND STRUCTURAL IMPACTS
This thesis address a question at the heart of Australia’s border: why does theAustralian state close its border to migrants whose labour could benefit capi-tal. Chapter one argued that Australia’s border is marked by a contradictory
dynamic of exclusion and incorporation that eludes theorists. Chapter two advanced a
Marxist theory of borders which conceives of the two opposing aspects of the contra-
diction as mutually internal, arguing that in mediating the contradictory movement,
borders serve to produce a reserve army, secure the conditions of superexploitation,
and divide workers through racism. It found that racism sits at the heart of the border
relation. The thesis has thus far formulated the theoretical tools to understand the ex-
clusionary moment of Australia’s border. For Marx, there are limitations to theoretical
treatments. Not only is the historical development of anything key to explaining it, but
that history forms part of what it is (Ollman, 2003: 151). Hence, Marx searches for those
essential characteristics which both explain and define the subject of study.
Chapter three traces the historical development of the most brutally exclusionary
moment of Australia’s border: its treatment of refugees. In doing so, it provides a study
of why Australia closes its borders to a particular group of people, applying the tools
developed in chapters one and two. The chapter investigates in turn the three major pil-
lars of the refugee regime—mandatory detention, offshore processing, and militarised
nationalism.
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Through these case studies, it makes three connected arguments. First, it argues
that refugee policy plays a domestic role, noting that refugee policy changes have been
accompanied by anti-refugee rhetoric aimed at the domestic audience. Second, it argues
that refugee racism has a systemic political-economic effect on capital’s reproduction,
pointing to the effects of over twenty years of continuous of refugee racism. Finally, it
argues that racism is not discretely portioned out at the refugee program and discon-
nected from the migration program.
Mandatory Detention
Public opposition to refugees is not hard-wired. It is rooted in a long history of the
rhetorical and concrete operation of borders. The roots of mandatory detention can be
found before 1992, when it was formally instituted by the Keating government. This
move was founded on the groundwork of anti-refugee rhetoric laid by a long line of
politicians. The origins of the rhetoric of ‘queue-jumping’ are to be found in the mouth
of Gough Whitlam (Stats, 2015: 77). Whitlam linked refugees, crime, and disease in his
push to intensify border security (Stevens, 2012a: 530). The “deep economic recession”
of the late 1970s was said to provide “fertile ground for those agitating to tighten im-
migration and refugee policies” (Garnier & Cox, 2012: 3). Immigration ministers under
Fraser dismissed refugees as economic migrants (Stevens, 2012a: 538), threatened to
block entry (Canberra Times, 1979a), and oversaw deportations to danger (Canberra
Times, 1979b). Fraser himself threatened to deport Vietnamese boatpeople landing in
Australia (Stevens, 2012b). It is also hard not to see a fundamental congruence between
Howard’s insistence on Australia’ sovereign right to ‘decide who comes here and in what
circumstances’ and Hawke’s remark in 1977 as president of the Australian Labor Party
(ALP), about Australia’s “right to determine how it will exercise its compassion and how
it will increase its population” (Stats, 2015: 78). The modern refugee regime is grounded
in a history of continuous border-control rhetoric.
Mandatory detention was also prefigured by racism embodied in concrete policy.
From 1958, the policy was to lock up those arriving in Australia without a visa, though
it was not mandatory in law (Betts, 2001: 37). In 1989, anti-refugee border control was
stepped up considerably. The Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1989 was among
the “the most fundamental changes to Australia’s immigration laws”, designed to im-
prove “our ability to curb abuse of the immigration program by people seeking to come
to Australia illegally” (Ray, 1989). It introduced a harsh regime of ‘mandatory depor-
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tation’ after a 28-day grace period. Cambodian boat arrivals from 1989 faced a policy
described as “administrative detention” (Phillips & Spinks, 2013a). The average length
of detention shot up from 15 days to 523 days for Cambodian boat arrivals (Phillips &
Spinks, 2013a). While the policy was formally discretionary, it was applied to “all people
entering Australia without a valid visa. . . while their immigration status was resolved”,
which meant years in detention for Cambodian boat arrivals (Phillips & Spinks, 2013a).
To “deal with” the growing numbers of Cambodian refugees (Canberra Times, 1990), the
Port Hedland detention centre was established in 1991 and refugee “processing centres”
were introduced into law (Commonwealth, 1991: 9). The architecture of mandatory de-
tention was in place before 1992.
This period saw inflamed anti-refugee political rhetoric. Foreign Minister Gareth
Evans warned repeatedly in 1990-91 of “unregulated population flows” from Asia (G.
Evans, 1991), despite the historically small numbers of refugees coming to Australia.
Laurie Ferguson, an MP of Labor Left, described Cambodian boat people as “bogus ar-
rivals who think it might be quicker to get a Ford Falcon here than in Kampuchea”
(The Socialist, 1992). In a long tradition of Parime Ministers denying the authentic-
ity of asylum claims, Hawke (cited in The Socialist, 1995: 2) claimed “these people are
not political refugees”. Immigration Minister Gerry Hand was key in delegitimising
asylum seekers’ claims, protests, and supporters—calling the protests of three women
fleeing the Khmer Rouge “pointless and. . . unnecessary”, implementing laws allowing
for force-feeding, and mocking protesters as “noble crusade[rs]” (Steward, 1992). The
UNHCR condemned Australia’s policy for failing to protect the rights of children de-
tained at this time (Bramble & Kuhn, 2010: 116). Anti-refugee rhetoric coincided with
the establishment of the architecture for mandatory detention.
Mandatory detention was formalised in 1992 with an amendment to the Migration
Act providing that “each non-citizen who is a designated person should be kept in immi-
gration detention until he or she: (a) leaves Australia; or (b) is given a visa” (Common-
wealth, 1992 Section 176). The legislation “formalised into law” the largely pre-existing
detention regime (York, 2003: 14). This was used by Immigration Minister Gerry Hand
as an opportunity to appear tough on immigration (Bolger, 2016: 209). The explicit aim
was to “enhance the Government’s control of people who wish to cross our borders”
(Gerry Hand, as cited in Phillips & Spinks, 2013b: 6). In 1994, when the law was due to
formally come into force, the 294-day limit was removed, formalising the policy of indef-
inite detention. Mandatory detention’s history is intimately bound up with the rhetoric
of border control.
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While both rhetoric and policy was continuous under various governments, the con-
struction of modern mandatory detention occurred under Hawke-Keating governments.
What is striking about the development of mandatory detention is the prominence of
rhetorical assurances of border control, promulgated in English and seemingly targeted
at a domestic audience rather than at refugees themselves. This supports the under-
standing of borders that emphasises its domestic ideological role in securing racism
and nationalism as preconditions of capital accumulation.
Contradictory Pressures
This moment of exclusion contains also an incorporative element. Though mandatory
detention has persisted as a bipartisan feature of Australian capitalism, it has been
marked by contradictory pressures of exclusion and incorporation. The same pressures
which led to the racist scapegoating of refugees and its ultimate embodiment in the
brutalisation of refugees in detention facilities continues unchanged. But as the state
is pushed to lock up refugees in detention centres, that same brutality tends to create
crises. Refugees fight back against deplorable conditions, frequently sparking solidarity
protests in Australia more broadly. The imprisonment of refugees leads to the continual
production of controversies and backlashes against cruelty. A plethora of reports have
continued to detail the conditions of Australia’s detention camps (Human Rights and
Equal Opportunity Commission, 1998, e.g. 2004).
This contradictory pressure has been felt in the perpetual opening and closing of
different detention centres across Australia. Curtin detention centre was opened in re-
mote Western Australia in 1999. In 2000, refugees coordinated a protest of mass break
outs between Curtin, Woomera and Port Hedland. In 2002, national outrage saw Curtin
detention centre closed. After Hazara refugees went on hunger strike, demanding ac-
cess to legal support, men were locked in an isolation unit (O’Neill & Jones, 2002).
Many were driven to self-harm, with one refugee falling unconscious in altercation with
guards. Presuming him dead, refugees started a violent protest, tearing down fences to
free those locked in isolation. This precipitated the closing of the centre.
Woomera detention centre was opened in 1999 in the South Australian desert. Self-
harm and protest were common. In 2002, during one hunger strike, one asylum seeker
attempted suicide, prompting violent protest, and increases in self-harm (Fernandez,
2013). At least 500 Australian protesters joined a camp outside the detention centre
(Phillips & Spinks, 2013b). In a coordinated action designed to allow those inside and
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outside the camp to meet, protesters broke down an outer fence and rallied inside. Up
to 50 refugees escaped, though the majority were returned to the detention centre. The
centre was closed in 2003, with refugees shuffled to other detention centres. Other de-
tention centres were opened and closed, including Baxter from 2002-07 (SMH, 2003)
and later Curtin from 2013-14 (Gribbin, 2014; P. Taylor, 2013).
The overall political trend in this period was an upsurge in anti-racist efforts, in-
cluding rallies against the Iraq war, unions for refugees and Labor for Refugees work-
ing against the policy. Though the structures of mandatory detention were maintained,
pressure saw children released to ‘community detention’ by 2005 (Phillips & Spinks,
2013b). From 2007, following political mobilisation, this trend was reversed, with num-
bers in mandatory detention increasing again. The movement of exclusion contains
elements of incorporation. However, this moment of inclusion is heavily contingent
on struggle. It faces a border structurally weighted towards the production of racism
through rhetorical and concrete division.
Offshore Processing
Offshore processing sees the same detention of refugees escalated—pushed brutally
overseas. This move toward militarism and the creation of neo-colonial camps has been
historically predicated on domestic pressures. This section argues the exclusionary mo-
ment is not just linked to political gains to politicians, but also structural economic
gains for capital.
The origins of offshore processing can be found before 2001 when Howard opened
the first refugee detention centre on Nauru. The Fraser government helped fund—
and “strongly lobbied” neighbouring governments to set up—refugee camps including
in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Hong Kong (Sheehan, 2007). The conditions in these camps
were notorious. Men, women, and children were imprisoned for years at Hei Ling Chau
camp in Hong Kong, a rock island and ex-leper colony replete with barbed wire (Basler,
1988). Hundreds died at the Galang refugee camp in Indonesia, with suicide, rape, and
self-immolation commonplace (Fitzpatrick, 2009). These camps remained open for years
under Hawke and Keating governments. They also embodied a rhetorical emphasis on
sorting the ‘genuine’ refugees from the ‘rest’. Many made it to Australia, but the pro-
cess preferenced those refugees who were the “‘best fit’ for Australia’s migration” such
as skilled refugees and professionals (Bolger, 2016: 205). Hawke and Keating govern-
ments continued to finance refugee camps in Malaysia and Indonesia (Griffiths, 1992).
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Though the Australian government had a clear hand in these camps, refugees were set-
tled to Canada and the USA as well as Australia, and the UNHCR and Doctors without
Borders had a presence. These early camps were a combination of offshore processing
and regional cooperation.
The modern offshore processing regime was born in the lead up to the 2001 election.
Before a small Indonesian fishing boat filled with asylum seekers entered Australian
waters in August 2001, the Sydney Morning Herald predicted the Liberal—National
coalition would lose the election and Howard would lose his seat, with voters angry
about petrol prices and the introduction of a Goods and Services Tax (Cumming, 2001).
However, August brought a substantial change, when a Norwegian cargo ship—the MV
Tampa—picked up and attempted to bring the 438 predominantly Hazara refugees to
Australia. But rather than provide the food and medicine requested, the Australian
government quickly militarised Christmas Island, and sent SAS troops to board the
freighter (Marr & Wilkinson, 2004: 75–88). This bred a flurry of media coverage, and
the refugees were drummed up into a full international crisis.
In this climate, Howard announced the beginnings of the ‘Pacific Solution’. In return
for a $16.5 million payment to the Nauruan government, mainly securing drinking wa-
ter and annulling hospital debts to Australia, Nauru agreed to a camp being set up
on the island (Marr & Wilkinson, 2004: 108–9). The asylum seekers were transferred
to the HMAS Manoora with threats of force and moved to Nauru (Marr & Wilkinson,
2004: 126). The Australian government also commenced negotiations for another off-
shore processing camp in Papua New Guinea (PNG), which was set up on Manus Island
in October 2001 (Marr & Wilkinson, 2004: 159). These moves were predicated on the
posturings of a government consciously portraying itself as tough on refugees.
Media articles demonising the refugees were rife during the period. Maley (2004:
155) argues many displayed the “hallmarks of having been planted by government
sources”—with media containing information likely only known by high-level immigra-
tion officials, as well as close links between reporters and the immigration department,
and explicit ministerial compliance. The legal negotiations following the Tampa oc-
curred in the aftermath of attacks on the world trade centre in September 2001. Howard
took this as an opportunity to further the demonisation of refugees, arguing “you don’t
know who’s coming and you don’t know whether they [refugees] do have terrorist links
or not”.
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Structural benefits
Following this media storm, there was a surge in support Howard government. Marr
and Wilkinson (2004) argue that this, along with other racist refugee rhetoric such as
the ‘children overboard affair’, helped facilitate the Liberal—National Coalition’s 2001
electoral victory, off the back of predicted electoral loss at the beginning of the year.
But the 2001 election campaign presents a key example of the kind of structural ben-
efits that accrue to capital when anti-refugee sentiment is propagated year after year
by politician after politician. For more than just assisting electoral chances, it was also
a distraction from the issues in that election cycle. 2001 was a year of intensified class
warfare. For H. Manning (2002: 237), “[p]rior to the Tampa saga and the war against
terrorism, industrial relations appeared likely to be one of the key campaign issues” .
In August 2001, the Howard government had launched the Royal Commission into the
Building and Construction Industry, which would eventually “recommended the estab-
lishment of an independent commission, provisionally called the Australian Building
and Construction Commission” which would wage industrial war on the CFMEU (Cole,
2003: 13). In the campaign itself, Howard introduced three key anti-union policies (H.
Manning, 2002: 238–9). First, he argued for a requirement for the performance of a
secret ballot before every strike action, which would slow down bargaining processes
and be a strong demobilising force. Second was an exemption of small businesses from
fair dismissal laws. And third was increased powers for small business to fight sec-
ondary union boycotts through the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission.
The Liberal Government also indicated moves to make breaking up unions easier, and
launched an attack on the ALP’s support for ‘pattern-bargaining’ (H. Manning, 2002:
239,242). This provides an example of how refugees can function as a “red herring”
(Kuhn, 2007: 18) behind which governments in power can prosecute economic agen-
das that could otherwise be deeply unpopular. It also indicates that racism can have a
systemic economic role.
This systemic role was also felt in the election itself. Changes in government’s elec-
toral promise increased pressure on the unions to direct energy towards electoral strat-
egy, and side-lining a focus on industrial struggle. Unions spent millions on a ‘marginal
seats campaign’ (H. Manning, 2002: 243), which directed worker’s energies to the ballot
box. This too is indicative of the structural benefits racism can have to capitalism.
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Offshore Processing Rebooted
Offshore processing was also subject to the inclusionary moment of borders that affected
mandatory detention. The Manus Island detention centre was eventually closed in May
2004, after political and legal pressure to release the final occupant—Aladdin Sisalem—
whom was left as the sole refugee in the centre for ten months (Jackson, 2004). Nauru
remained open until in February 2008, on the back of years of political mobilisation, the
last refugees on Nauru were granted residency in Australia (C. Evans, 2008). However,
the same press release promised that “future unauthorised boat arrivals will be pro-
cessed on Christmas Island” (C. Evans, 2008), in the new detention centre completed
and opened in that year (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2012: 14). The con-
tingency of inclusionary struggle remains a potentially powerful force, but the border’s
exclusionary racism runs deep.
Unsettling similarities can be found between moves made by Howard and those of
ALP governments years later. In 2009, Rudd attempted to reboot the Howard’s policy
with his own ‘Indonesia solution’. In October, one boat of 78 Sri Lankan asylum-seekers
were rescued and put aboard customs ship the Oceanic Viking (Manne, 2010: 12). Rudd
attempted to offload the people to Tanjung Pinang refugee camp, financed by Australia.
However the refugees refused to leave the ship, and protests in Indonesia and Australia
added pressure, with the state eventually capitulating, promising them resettlement
in Australia (Fitzpatrick, 2009). In April 2010, the Rudd government increased border
protection policy and rhetoric by suspending the processing of Sri Lankan and Afghan
asylum applications, and reopening Curtin detention centre (Refugee Council of Aus-
tralia, 2016).
In July, the new Prime Minister Julia Gillard took steps to intensify Labor’s anti-
refugee credentials. In her first major policy speech to the Lowy Institute, she stepped
up border control rhetoric, with her call to “stop the boats”, driving home the rhetorical
wedge pitting refugees against ‘working people’ (Gillard, 2010a). She insisted:
“That hardworking Australians who themselves are doing it tough want to
know that refugees allowed to settle here are not singled out for special treat-
ment; That people like my own parents who have worked hard all their lives
can’t abide the idea that others might get an inside track to special privileges”
(Gillard, 2010b)
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Gillard was also clear to link this to the migration program in general. She argued
“the debate on sustainable population growth” should be undertaken unconstrained by
“political correctness”. Rather, she called for a frank debate about “border protection and
asylum seekers”, on which her position was clearly militarisation and intensification of
the border (Gillard, 2010a). She inaugurated a new position of Minister for Sustainable
Population (Karlsen, 2010). Gillard linked the tiny numbers of refugees with a fear of
mass migration, and portrayed her government as protector from any such invasion.
This affected the 2010 election, with 73.9% of voters rating refugees and asylum
seekers as "extremely important" or "quite important" in their voting decision (McAl-
lister et al., 2011: 74). However, the impact went deeper. Gillard’s capitulation to the
right made ‘stop the boats’ rhetoric a bipartisan policy. This rhetorically recasts the is-
sue of ‘stopping the boats’ from subject of political debate, to an issue on which both
sides of parliament can agree. This reinforces the idea that migrants are to blame for
environmental problems and job losses, arguably playing a role in limiting the window
of acceptable political discourse. This in turn plays a role in reinforcing the legitimacy
of Australian capitalism.
The dynamic of exclusion pushes not towards stagnant but increasing ostracism.
Gillard went on to implement an increasingly cruel refugee regime. She signed a mem-
orandum of understanding with Afghanistan allowing for the involuntary repatriation
of Afghan asylum seekers, and started construction on a new detention centre at Wick-
ham Point (Refugee Council of Australia, 2016). Soon after her ascension to prime-
ministership she announced a new offshore processing regime with the “East Timor
solution”, though this was not to eventuate (SMH, 2010). This pre-figured her later at-
tempts at a Malaysia solution, which aimed to involuntarily move 800 asylum seekers
to Malaysia, a country with no refugee protections. After a High Court dismissal, she
attempted to change the migration act to grant ministerial powers to send refugees to
any country, though this too was unsuccessful (Gleeson, 2016: 20). In September 2012,
Nauru’s offshore processing centre was reopened, and asylum seekers were sent there
once again (Refugee Council of Australia, 2016). Steps were taken to start using the
remnants of the detention centres that Howard set up in PNG, under the so called “no
advantage” rule, which ensured that refugees would languish in Australia’s offshore
detention centres for as long as other refugees were waiting in Indonesia.
This would only get worse in 2013, when on the 19th of July, Rudd (cited in Crowe &
Callick, 2013) introduced, seven weeks out from the election, that “any asylum-seeker
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who arrives in Australia by boat will have no chance of being settled in Australia”—
an unprecedented step in Australia’s border history. This was accompanied by tough
talk on the “scourge of people smuggling” (Rudd, 2013). Later that year, Temporary
Protection Visas were reintroduced (Grewcock, 2014b: 104). In the 2013 election, parties
competed on refugee cruelty. Opposition leader Tony Abbott led a campaign dominated
by “stop the boats” sloganeering (Abbott, 2013). In the election, 80.1% of respondents
to one poll rated refugees and asylum seekers “extremely” or “quite important” in their
voting behaviour, with over half of those rating it of ‘extreme’ importance (Bean et al.,
2014). Offshore processing has remained in place since then.
The continuation of offshore processing under successive governments, moving against
the inclusionary moment of struggle, is testament to the depth of racism in the border.
The effect of anti-refugee rhetoric, repeated year after year, builds up ‘common sense’
notions of anti-refugee racism and scapegoating. Indeed one of the reasons it is so elec-
torally effective is because it has been stoked for so many years. This ubiquity of refugee
cruelty points to the thesis that it serves not merely an occasional, contingent role, but
a structural role in securing Australian capitalism. Offshore processing casts the Aus-
tralian state as the protector of the working class against refugees. These refugees are
scapegoated for unemployment and the ‘special priviliges’ that domestic workers are
missing out on. This role in the production of racist division welds domestic worker to
capital.
Militarised nationalism
Australia’s refugee policy has become intertwined with the production of militarised
nationalism, which provides a prime example of political cynicism. This thesis traces
modern militarised nationalism around refugees to ‘Operation Relex’—a child of the
Tampa affair. This was the well-publicised militarisation of Australia’s Northern ter-
ritorial waters. Brigadier Gary Bornholt revealed that it explicitly sought to “target”
the “Australian domestic audience” in its message of border control (Marr & Wilkinson,
2004: 135), the media rules also explicitly prohibited the ‘humanising’ of refugees.
One of the first exercises of Operation Relex was the furore surrounding the Sus-
pected Illegal Entry Vessel (SIEV) 4—the ‘children overboard’ scandal. It showed the
clear role of governments in producing racism, with the Howard government manufac-
turing racist fears, fabricating evidence, and using the military for political purposes.
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On 7 October, two days after the start of the 2001 election campaign, Immigration Min-
ister Ruddock reported that refugees on the SIEV 4 had thrown their children overboard
in an attempt to force the Australian military to initiate a rescue. He argued “people
would not come wearing life jackets unless they planned an action of this sort” (Marr
& Wilkinson, 2004: 186). The report was repeated by various government ministers in
the coming weeks, including Prime Minister Howard who contributed: “I don’t want in
Australia people who would throw their own children into the sea, I don’t think any
Australian does” (Slattery, 2003: 95). The story was, however, completely untrue.
Though the purported ‘children overboard’ incident occurred on 7 October, Peter
Reith’s media office released images taken on the following day when the vessel was
sinking. The images showed children in the water, and so with the dates and captions
removed, Reith was able to claim they provided evidence of the incident, describing it as
an “absolute fact” (Reith, as cited in Slattery, 2003: 96). Despite being informed that the
images did not support the story, Reith made no effort to correct it. Rather, he claimed
that video footage provided “even starker evidence” than the photographs, but that “op-
erational security” prevented him from being able to share it (Marr & Wilkinson, 2004:
209). Reith’s response to being informed that the video did not show any children in the
water, and that the incident may not have occurred at all, was: “Well, we better not see
the video then” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002: 86). Even when the department was
directly informed that there was “no documentary evidence” for the incident and that
the claims were unfounded sensationalism, the Coalition refused to amend the record
(Marr & Wilkinson, 2004: 255). It was in this climate of racism that Howard proclaimed
in an election speech “we will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in
which they come”, bolstering government credentials on border racism (Howard, 2001).
On November 8th, just two days before the election, Howard released part of an Office of
National Assessments report which he claimed evidenced the incident, aiming to evade
the escalating media scrutiny and continue the racist fabrication. In fact, the classified
report consisted of secondary sources merely repeating the original fiction. These mili-
tary tendencies have continued to exist under various guises, Operation Relex turning
into Operation Resolute. This instances is indicative of the cynicism with which politi-
cians sometimes stoke anti-refugee sentiment.
Since then, rhetorical and physical moves by the Australian state have made clear
links between refugees, economic prosperity, and security risks. In 2013, the Liberal
Government introduced Operation Sovereign Borders—a civilian law enforcement agency,
led by a 3-star military commander reporting to the Immigration Minister. The integra-
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tion of military structures and individuals was matched by language, uniforms and of-
ficer ranks, with some public servants leaving as a result. In making these changes, the
promise was to “treat the border protection crisis as a national emergency and tackle it
with the focus and energy that an emergency demands” (Coalition, 2013: 2).
On the day of Abbot’s election, the immigration department was renamed Depart-
ment of Immigration and Border Protection, and the website eventually changed to
www.border.gov.au (Hodge, 2015: 122). In 2015, the Australian Border Force was estab-
lished aiming to achieve: “strong national security”, “a strong economy”, and “a pros-
perous and cohesive society” (ABF, 2017). The Border Force Act also included strong
secrecy laws which threatened up to two years imprisonment for health professionals
whistleblowing about abuses in Australia’s detention centres. In 2017, the Turnbull gov-
ernment proposed putting Immigration Minister Peter Dutton in charge of a new Home
Affairs ministry, combining spy, police, border and other agencies (Yosufzai, 2017). This
rhetorically linked national security, economic wellbeing, and refugees, as part of the
production of the ‘common sense’ linkages of those ideas through the process of scape-
goating.
Conclusion
Australia’s refugee regime is a policy particularly marked by the promulgation of racism.
Through studies of mandatory detention, offshore processing, and militarised nation-
alism, this chapter aimed to probe this racist division. This chapter found that anti-
refugee rhetoric was the constant accomplice of harsh border policy. This suggests that
the domestic reception of refugee policy is a primary concern. More evidence was found
for this thesis in the roots of militarised nationalism, where the Howard government
deliberately misled voters for electoral gain.
This chapter also found a continuity of anti-refugee rhetoric and harsh refugee pol-
icy under Labor and Liberal governments alike. Harsh refugee policy and rhetoric oc-
curred during non-election periods, as well as election periods. The cumulative effect of
repeated anti-refugee rhetoric and policy, repeated by government after government for
over twenty years, is more than just a couple of election victories. It plays a key role
in the production of hegemony. It concretises ruling class ideas into ‘common sense’.
Refugees become illegitimate migrants, undermining the employment and welfare of
domestic Australians. The state becomes protector of Australian workers. Domestic
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workers become bound to capital. But of course, this is all bound up in racial divisions,
not as object, but as process, continually functioning to produce hegemony. This chapter
pointed to the example of union struggle in 2001 to illustrate the structural function of
anti-refugee racism.
Finally, this chapter noted that the refugee program and migration programs cannot
be neatly separated. Politicians and government departments link the small numbers of
refugees with worries about population growth and what impact this might have. This
conclusion hints that the same continuity of border racism, structural benefits of border
racism, may apply also to the migration program, where the incorporation moment of
border is purportedly dominant.
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AUSTRALIA’S MIGRATION PROGRAM: THE
INTERNALITY OF EXCLUSION
M igration in early colonial Australia and under the WAP has been analysed, andsoundly condemned for its overt racism. But the modern migration programis often said to have facilitated the transformation of Australia from explicitly
racist nation to one of the world’s most multicultural. This chapter questions the extent
of this purported transformation. Chapter one established that the border was marked
by a contradiction between exclusion and incorporation. Chapter two advanced three in-
terconnected Marxist theories that attempted to grasp the contradiction—reserve army,
superexploitation, and racist divisions. It argued that racism underlies the border rela-
tion. Chapter three analysed Australia’s refugee regime, finding a continuity of racism
and linking this to structural benefits.
Chapter four turns these insights to the migration program. It uses the categories
of reserve army, superexploitation, and racism as a lens through which to analyse Aus-
tralia’s migration program. It considers first the permanent program, before turning to
the temporary program’s three main component parts: temporary skilled workers (or
457s), students, and working holiday makers. This chapter does not find evidence that
a single explanation is by itself satisfactory to describe the border relation. Rather, dif-
ferent explanations gain prominence in the different components of the border. But nor
does it find that the explanations support the border symmetrically. Rather, they are
interconnected and presuppose one another.
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At closer levels of analysis—at the level of the programs themselves—it is frequently
the case that programs are described by superexploitation or reserve army. But this
chapter argues that the operation of these explanations is intimately bound up with
racism, both promulgating and relying on it. At higher levels of abstraction, over the
migration program as a whole, the border relation enacts division, moving through its
twin rhetorical and concrete moments to construct the ‘common sense’ of national and
racial divisions.
This chapter makes three interconnected arguments. First it argues that borders
have concretely and rhetorically divided workers through a long process of producing
‘common sense’ racism. Secondly, it argues that the border’s role in securing reserve
army and ‘superexploitated’ migrants, has relied on, and enacted racism. And finally, it
points to the real impact this has in terms of diverting class sentiment against migrants,
not only fruitlessly but harmfully.
Permanent Program
Migration has been one of the main methods of regulating the Australian labour force.
Each year, the Immigration department lets in migrants according to a ‘planning in-
take’. Since 1947, about half of the labour force increase has come via immigration
(Collins, 2008: 249). Due to the significance of migration in determining labour force
sizes, migration gives the state a strong influence in determining the numbers of work-
ers in Australia. For Jupp (1993: 255), Australia has “one of the most tightly controlled
and carefully planned immigration intakes in the world”. The permanent migration
program has facilitated for Australian capital a latent reserve army—those drawn in
from outside productive Australian capital. Permanent migrants also formed part of
the ‘floating’ reserve army of people thrown in and out of employment. Recent migrants
are typically hit hardest by recessions, as they are “concentrated in industries” with the
highest job losses, and have the hardest time getting jobs (Ackland & Williams, 1992:
39).
Immigration numbers suggest this reserve army has artificially flooded the Aus-
tralian labour market. This intake level has certainly fluctuated along with the health
of Australia’s economy. Several temporary decreases in the permanent program have co-
incided with recessions, such as in the mid-1970s and early 1980s. Figure 4.1 presents
the upwards trend of total migration numbers against the relatively stable humanitar-
ian program since 1983. Post-1983, the most notable decrease occurs from the ‘Black
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Figure 4.1: Permanent versus Humanitarian intake 1983-2016
Tuesday’ crash of 1987 to the end of the ‘recession we had to have’ in 1992. In this pe-
riod, Australia’s migration program fell by 44.3 per cent. Following a downturn in the
mid-1990s and the ‘great recession’ of 2008, immigration decreased by 18.9 per cent and
1.6 per cent respectively. While intake numbers have fluctuated, there has been a trend
towards larger intakes since the 1980s. This likely reflects a period of the almost unin-
terrupted expansion of capital accumulation. Even in the depths of the recession of the
early 1990s, with increasing unemployment, intake numbers did not drop below 60 000.
The fact that migrants were still added to the labour force in large numbers despite
increasing unemployment suggests that the reserve army is not merely tracking supply
and demand pressures. The aggregate data provides limited indicative support for the
thesis that borders have allowed for an injection of a reserve army migrants over and
above supply and demand pressures.
Internal to this incorporative moment of the border is its exclusionary opposite. Mi-
gration numbers are fixed to the state planning levels. This requires the exclusion of
other migrants who might have crossed were the program not mediated by the state.
Thus coevolving alongside increases in the migration program has been an exclusionary
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moment, felt through a discriminatory points system. Introduced by the Fraser govern-
ment in 1979, the Numerical Multifactor Assessment System (NUMAS) instituted the
quantitative testing of migrants for eligibility to enter Australia. Though English lan-
guage skills and personal employability factors had been considered before, under the
NUMAS this was formalised into policy through a scoring mechanism (Hawkins, 1991:
142–5).
While a break from the overt discrimination of the White Australia Policy (WAP),
the points system still tangibly discriminates. English testing gives immediate advan-
tages to those from English speaking countries, while employability testing advantages
those from Western countries. These constitute a de-facto advantage to white and West-
ern immigrants. Indeed, the ALP initially opposed the legislation on these grounds.
Then opposition leader Bill Hayden argued it “discriminates in a significant way – al-
though not completely” on racial and economic grounds (cited in Hawkins, 1991: 144).
It is often claimed that the years since the end of WAP have made Australia ‘the most
multicultural country in the world’. However, this is not true by any common measure
(Jupp, 2007: 6–7). More Australians born overseas are from the United Kingdom than
any other country (Phillips et al., 2010: 24). According to the Australian Bureau of
Statistics (2017), most Australians speak only English, most are nominally Christian,
and more people report ‘English’ as their ancestry than any other category, including
‘Australian’. This homogeneity has withstood four decades of points tested permanent
migration, at relatively high levels. The points system represented a shift from explicit
to implicit discrimination.
This concrete discrimination was coupled with rhetorical push against immigrants.
Immigration Minister MacKellar (cited in Jupp, 2007: 145) announced that the new
NUMAS system would ensure that no one would be admitted “who would represent an
economic burden. . . through inordinate claims on welfare, health or other resources”.
The suggestion that migrants are a disproportionate burden on Australian society prop-
agates the myth that migrants are wholly or largely responsible for issues in the Aus-
tralian economy. However, evidence shows that similar proportions of migrants and
non-migrants rely on welfare, and that any disparities are swamped by the average
tax contribution of migrants, which is higher due to Australia dodging reproduction
costs (Castles et al., 1998: 62–4). While state expenditure on welfare and health has a
profound effect on workers’ access to these benefits, the same is not true of migration
numbers. MacKellar’s rhetoric helps form the idea that workers should channel their
energy towards opposing migrants and immigration, as opposed to a state that controls
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the funds to such programs. Similarly, his promises the program would not “jeopardise
social cohesiveness” (MacKellar, as cited in Jupp, 2007: 145) may have been interpreted
as an assurance the system would not allow too many ‘Asians’.
The rhetorical and concrete division of people based on place of origin, race, and
language has a key role in constructing ‘common sense’ notions that underlie division.
It cannot simply be assumed that the division of workers along national lines, tying
employment opportunities only to those available within one the nation of origin, is a
timeless and necessary fact of human existence. The existence of borders that enforce—
rhetorically and tangibly—a “socio-spatial segregation” must be understood as histori-
cally specific to capitalism (Ferguson & McNally, 2014: 13). It is only through its ongo-
ing operation that the border relation is turned into ‘common sense’ notions accepted
by many. The points system should be understood as a further implementation of this
process, helping to construct a rigid hierarchy of eligibility for migration to Australia.
Its shift from more discretionary entry requirements to objective and quantitative en-
try requirements was crucial in conferring legitimacy to the border relation. Moreover,
by concretising discriminatory requirements into the border, it entrenched the racial
element in national divisions.
Entrenchment of skilled migration
The contradiction between exclusion and incorporation is also affected by other rela-
tions. Structural changes in domestic and global capital have resulted in the “restruc-
turing of the Western economies”, borders included (Collins, 2008: 246). From the end
of the long-boom, changes in the contours of international capital have seen much low-
skilled manufacturing work shifted away from Australia to countries with lower labour
costs (Probert, 1996). This decrease in manufacturing is paired with a corresponding in-
crease in the other sectors, including finance, information technology, education, media
and communications (Mahony, 1993: 9; Collins, 2000: 13). Australia was no mere victim
of these changes; they were exacerbated and propelled by Hawke and Keating policy. By
floating the dollar, decreasing tariffs and interest rates, marketising wages and making
the reserve bank ‘independent’, Australia was rendered more susceptible to these global
pressures. This has metamorphosed the incorporation/exclusion contradiction.
The border’s dynamic has been shifted from towards the incorporation of high-skilled
workers. These workers fuel labour supply in the sectors required by the change. Under
Hawke, the category of skilled migrants rose from a small program to a significant por-
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Figure 4.2: Percentage makeup of Permanent Migration Program 1983-2016
tion of the permanent intake (B. Birrell, 2003: 38). This occurred despite the ALP’s ini-
tial condemnation of the discriminatory nature of the points system. Figure 4.2 presents
the proportional increase in skilled migration. Though experiencing fluctuations in re-
sponse to recessions, the proportion of skilled migrants has grown to become the dom-
inant mode of permanent migration. This incorporation relatively displaced family mi-
gration, overtaking it in 1997-98.
This metamorphosis in the incorporation/exclusion contradiction manufactured an-
other category of exclusion—family migrants. Immigration Minister Phillip Ruddock
(cited in Masanauskas, 2015) asks “If you’re bringing here people who have never worked,
never contributed, who are going to draw benefits, the community asks should we be
paying benefits to them?”. Throughout his tenure, Ruddock continually portrayed fam-
ily migrants as a “burden” on Australian taxpayers (cited in Mares, 2002: 142). Though
it is true that family migrants may draw welfare, this ignores the overall effects to the
Australian economy. Castles et al. (1998: 54–5) find that the migration of dependents—
especially older people—has positive net economic outcomes, including especially its
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impact in decreasing unemployment. The skilled/family distinction became a site of
portraying migrants as burdens. However, this was not limited to family migrants.
All migrants were the rhetorical butt of Howard-era exclusion. For Pietsch (2005:
112), Howard’s 1996 ‘For All of Us’ campaign was implicitly exclusionary, aiming to hint
that the system had previously unfairly advantaged migrants and the unemployed. The
campaign launch was summed up in the Daily Telegraph: “In essence, Mr Howard took
the $1 billion he wants saved over three years from the social security given to migrants
and the unemployed, and redirected it to the “battler” families with jobs” (Malcolm
Farr, as cited in P. Williams, 1997: 253). Howard took a stance against migrants for the
duration of his term, carrying out a loud and consistent campaign against ‘welfare fraud’
for the years following, despite the low incidence of actual cases (F. Taylor, 2009: 67).
Wilson and Turnbull (2001: 2) argue this constituted ‘wedge politics’, where “unpopular
or stigmatised” groups are targetted for political gain.
Rhetoric was paired with policy changes that presented Howard as protector of
‘Aussie battlers’ against migrants and welfare cheats. The Howard government ex-
tended the period for which migrants were denied access to welfare to two years. High-
lighting the continuity in the migration program, the denial of welfare payments was
originally implemented under Keating as a 6-month ban. The strong statements and
loud promulgations with which this was announced were not, however, matched by sig-
nificant savings to government expenditure. The degree to which migrants actually use
social security relative to the Australian-born population has been significantly over-
stated (Whiteford, 1991). Indeed, Jupp (2007: 149) argues cuts to migrant welfare made
no substantial difference to government expenditure. While the cuts make little eco-
nomic difference, they make powerful political tools. They are a concrete expression of
the idea that migrants are a drain on the economy.
Shifts towards skilled migration facilitated higher value-transfers to Australian cap-
ital. As the migration program was skewed in favour of those with more qualifications,
Australian capital shifted reproduction costs overseas. While welfare cuts made little
difference to capital, these changes represent a saving to Australian capital. For exam-
ple, Birrell et al. (2001: 15) estimate the ‘brain gain’ to Australia in the three years from
1997-8 to be 24 420 managers and administrators, 32 628 professionals, 6 404 associate
professionals, 12 113 tradespeople, and 8 567 other. Australia avoided subsidising the
education of all of these workers. As an indicative measure, if the Australian state had
to pay for just the subsidised portion of the tertiary education of those professionals and
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associate professionals at the 2014 Commonwealth Grant Scheme levels (ABC, 2017),
this would cost over $412 million. This does not include other expenditure on primary
and secondary education.
The actions of unions and social movements have often reflected these ideas. One
example of this is in the Hawke government’s vague and strange proposal for a ‘Multi-
Function Polis’ (MFP). The MFP was a proposed city built in the Australian desert,
using Japanese capital, designed to be a futuristic cultural and technological hub (see
Rundle, 2015). The proposal included legislation that would limit labour rights and
thus the ability of unions to organise in the MFP. However, resistance to the MFP
was couched in highly racist terms. Precursor to the Greens, the RAINBOW Alliance
concentrated in its literature on the 100 000 people who would be brought in “up to
80% of whom may be Japanese”, including several racist Japanese caricatures (Bram-
ble, 1990: 14). One protest rally at Coomera saw people wearing “Slap a Jap” T-shirts
(Griffiths, 1990). Rather than focus on the anti-union legislation or conditions, workers
were drawn to anti-Japanese and racist ideas. This potentially makes it more difficult
to unionise Asian workers in the future by encouraging racist sentiment. It also acted
as an electoral distraction, which Rundle (2015) argues was instrumental in Peacock’s
1990 electoral win. This indicates the function that the racist divisions of border can
have in both galvanising electoral support and deflecting class sentiment against for-
eigners.
The border’s twin concrete and rhetorical movement has been a powerful mode of di-
vision. Concrete changes in the border enacting division of workers have occurred con-
tinuously, including election and non-election times, and over different political lead-
erships. Its rhetorical edge is often deployed by individual politicians, sometimes as
‘wedge politics’ aiming to target political opponents. However, the long-term impact of
the constant deployment of this division for political ends, had been a political-economic
formation of division. This continuous movement of the border through concrete and
rhetorical modes enacts the division of workers in both modes. It has led to the gradual
construction of ‘common sense’ ideas of racism, with domestic workers encouraged to
perceive migrants as threats whose interests are opposed to theirs.
Temporary Program
Temporary migration has changed the face of the Australian border. In 1999, numbers
of temporary migrants overtook permanent migration, and have grown exponentially
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since (Hugo & Harris, 2011: 5). Numbers now approach two million (Mares, 2016: 274).
Hugo (2006) estimates that temporary migrants contribute approximately 400 000 full
time jobs, or 3.9% of the workforce. For Mares (2016: 39), temporary migration is “no
longer a marginal phenomenon” but rather “integral to boosting the responsiveness
of the labour market to changing economic conditions, enabling employers to access a
supply of workers at all skill levels who can be more easily hired or let go as the situation
demands”.
Temporary migration should not be conceived as a discrete form of existence in Aus-
tralia, disconnected from other forms of residence. Rather, it is the production of a cer-
tain form of restricted residence. Migrants are denied economic and political rights by
function of their place of birth. Temporary visas come with the hanging threat of depor-
tation, which entrenches these inequalities further. Temporary migrants are frequently
subject to poor conditions. Despite the fact temporary migrants make up around 5 per
cent of Australia’s workforce, they accounted for 11.7 per cent of complaints to the Fair
Work Ombudsman (FWO, 2016: 46). This is indicative of the ‘superexploitative’ condi-
tions many migrant workers face.
Temporary migration is also continuous with permanent migration, forming a hy-
brid program. Many ‘temporary’ migrants transition to permanent migration (Dau-
vergne & Marsden, 2014: 230). In 2003-04, around a third of permanent places were
granted onshore to people on temporary visas (Hugo, 2006: 227). In one survey, Khoo
(2008) found that over 95% of migrants had either already applied for, or intended to
apply for, permanent residency (PR). But only a fraction actually gain PR. Temporary
migration thus acts as an extended testing regime preceding the permanent program.
The three major categories of temporary migrant are 457 visa holders, students,
and working holiday makers. Though the three are marked by different dynamics, this
chapter argues in each case that the production of temporary migration as a category
both relies on the pre-existence of racist divisions, and produces those racist divisions.1
Temporary Skilled Workers—457-visas
Operating from 1996-2017, the ‘temporary skilled-worker scheme’ allowed for a four-
year stay, sponsored by business, in areas of high labour demand (Markus et al., 2009:
1Though outside the scope of this thesis, New Zealand citizens also make up a large proportion of
the temporary workforce (Mares, 2016: 128–53). There may also be a higher number of undocumented
migrants than is commonly thought (SSCEE, 2016: 204).
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63). Its origins can be found under the Keating government in the 1995 Roach report,
which argued for more flexibility, company transfers and easier access to skills (Khoo
et al., 2007: 9), again evidencing political continuity between Liberal and Labor govern-
ments.
The main restriction on 457 workers is that residency is tied to employment. The
visa is conditional on the migrant worker holding a sponsored job. If they lose the job,
they are given 90 days to find a new one, or their visa is revoked, leaving them liable
to deportation (Larsen, 2013). Should they wish to transition to another job without
the risk of deportation, they are also denied the ability to work a second job. The PR
pathway also requires a 457 worker stay with an employer for two years, exacerbating
the pressures tying workers to their employers (SSCEE, 2016: 146). On top of working
restrictions, 457 visa-holders are also denied access to welfare, despite paying taxes,
are denied the right to vote, and denied access to public healthcare, instead having to
purchase private cover (Larsen, 2013).
The conditionality of a migrant workers’ residence on their employer ties the worker
to capital tightly, and renders them particularly vulnerable to mistreatment. It intro-
duces a structural power imbalance wherein migrants are pressured to endure poor
conditions to avoid losing their visa status. Perversely, if employers do break labour
laws, it puts 457 workers further at structural disadvantage. Not only does it consti-
tute a breach of visa condition opening the possibility of deportation, but it constitutes
a criminal offence (SSCEE, 2016: 147). Migrants have reported receiving pay at rates
for their country of origin, receiving pay at below award-wages, being prohibited from
joining unions, and being threatened with sacking and deportation (H. Williams, 2007:
4–5). While some of these cases, such as reports of wages less than a dollar per hour, are
probably marginal, the systemic reliance of migrants on employers leave them liable to
abuse. Competitive pressures also mean that capitalists are structurally driven to un-
dercut each other. Temporary migrant workers disproportionately believe that discrim-
ination occurs regarding conditions, with over 50 per cent of personal services workers,
and over 30 percent of hotels, restaurant and education worker reporting belief that
foreign workers are discriminated against in terms of working conditions (Khoo et al.,
2006: 17).
This movement contains contradictory pressures regarding national division. By
putting ‘foreign workers’ in the same country working alongside one another, these
personal connections open the potential for international proletarian solidarity. Con-
tradictorily however, it also opens the possibility of directing anti-migrant sentiment
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against workers living in the same country. But the 457 system does more than just put
workers alongside one another. It constructs a limited form of residence in which tempo-
rary workers in Australia do not have citizenship or full working rights, and even face
threats of deportation. This limitation of rights animates the tendency towards anti-
migrant sentiment being directed at fellow workers. National divisions are combined
with divided working conditions.
This concrete division has been joined by rhetorical division from across the polit-
ical spectrum. Pauline Hanson’s website cites 457 visas and refugees as the primary
examples of the “uncontrolled, mass migration” she hints may be “largely responsible
for Australia’s $150 billion welfare bill each year” (One Nation, 2015). But this senti-
ment is not limited to right populists. In the lead up to the 2013 federal election, Prime
Minister Julia Gillard undertook to wage “a fight. . . to stop foreign workers being put
at the front of the queue with Australian workers at the back” (as cited in Berg, 2015:
133). In one television advertisement campaign castigated for its predominantly white
cast, opposition leader Bill Shorten (2017) stated the Liberals were giving jobs to “457
overseas workers” despite the fact “the people who want the jobs are here”, promising
instead to “employ Australians first”. He blamed temporary workers for “lowering wage
outcomes and taking the jobs of nurses, motor mechanics, carpenters, auto-electricians”
(Shorten, cited in Karp, 2016). Even Greens MPs have argued that by endorsing 457
visas, the government of the day “wasn’t really serious about putting locals first” (Bandt,
2013) and questioning whether Pauline Hanson was “serious about looking after local
jobs” (cited in Karp, 2016b). Turnbull (2017) encouraged similar sentiments as Prime
Minister when he announced the abolishment of 457 visas, on the grounds that “Aus-
tralian workers must have priority for Australian jobs”, proclaiming the necessity of
“Australian jobs and Australian values”. Though the visas are concentrated in profes-
sional and management workers, politicians have focussed on the minority in construc-
tion and trades. They have frequently blamed 457s for unemployment, and poor wage
outcomes, despite the lack of evidence for said impacts (Castles et al., 1998: 54).
Workers have been led to oppose 457-visas. Many unions have joined together in a
‘Protect Aussie Jobs’ campaign. The Maritime Union of Australia (MUA, 2016) ran radio
ads linking migrant labour to “managing you out of a job too”. This nationalist campaign
led to the opposition of temporary migrant workers. The Construction Forestry Mining
and Energy Union (CFMEU, 2013) organised a rally in Melbourne, uploading images
of workers wearing T-shirts with an image of Victoria, with a cross going through ‘457’.
One picket of the Werribee sewage treatment farm, proclaimed “Stop visa (457) work-
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ers. Employ locals” (Lynch, 2013). Union officials and politicians almost universally
claimed their opposition was to the bad conditions imposed on temporary workers, and
not to the workers themselves. These campaigns and rhetoric, however, have fostered
working class antagonism to the temporary workers themselves. The substance of the
campaign was for the abolition of the visa class rather than the extension of full citizen-
ship rights to 457 workers. By mobilising domestic workers against temporary migrant
workers, and promoting nationalistic slogans for ‘Aussie jobs’, unions have fallen prey
to the politics of division. This provides indicative support for Marx’s (1976a: 799) the-
sis that immigration would rivet “the worker to capital more firmly than the wedges of
Hephaestus held Prometheus to the rock”.
Relying on Racism
The 457 visa allows for a closer realisation of the reserve army. It represents a shift
from supply- to demand- driven systems (Papademetriou et al., 2008). The scheme is
uncapped, making it far more flexible than the permanent program, which is fixed at
government predictions of the health of the economy. The 457 program thus frees cap-
ital’s need for migrant labour from the impediments of any errors in those predictions.
The worker’s residence in Australia is predicated on the employer’s direct need and
sponsorship. Moreover, it facilitates the hybrid temporary-permanent program where
migrants are subjected to more extensive testing to get a PR. While about 64 per cent
of 457 visa-holders report wishing to transition to PR, only about 50 per cent attain it
(B. Birrell & Healy, 2014: 20; Velayutham, 2013: 343). The 457 visa “acts as a filter”
allowing employers to test whether a worker is an ideal employee (Mares, 2016: 217).
If the employer deems the worker unfit for employment, not only is the migrant worker
fired, but can no longer remain in Australia, given 90 days before their visa is revoked.
457 workers face the conditions of superexploitation. While regulations are supposed
to prevent the undercutting of domestic wages, Birrell and Healy (2014: 22) indicate
“Employers of these cooks are almost certainly violating the rules by paying less than
the minimum amount and/or perhaps requiring extra hours beyond the award level”.
The SSCEE (2016: 153–4) documented cases of underpayment, threats, and unfair dis-
missal. One 457 contract stated (illegally) that workers “engaging in union activities. . .
shall shoulder the expenses for his/her own repatriation back to the Philippines” (SS-
CEE, 2016: 155).
This not only enacts racist divisions, but is founded on them. The conditions of su-
perexploitation are upheld by structural racism. This includes racism at work such as
56
TEMPORARY PROGRAM
discrimination, harassment, language barriers and differential treatment based on ap-
pearance (SSCEE, 2016: 153–4). Not only are these poor working conditions, it also
decreases job opportunities and makes it more difficult for migrants to seek out justice
in protective bodies. 457 migrants are not inherently more vulnerable, but rather this
vulnerability is produced through the border, and moreover, is underpinned by racism.
Students-migrants-workers
Students are the largest category of temporary migrant worker.2 They are difficult to
classify, sitting at the nexus of education, migration, and work. Neilson (2009) terms
them “students-migrants-workers” (SMWs)—to use an “apt, albeit awkward” neologism
(Robertson, 2011: 2195). SMWs are workers—both in-training and frequently while
studying. They face economic pressures, including exorbitant upfront fees and living
costs, which pushes many into work while studying. Without waged work, a “significant
proportion” would receive an income “less than half the Henderson Poverty Line” (Ny-
land et al., 2009: 1). In 2006, 56 per cent of international students engaged in paid work
according to one survey (AEI, 2007). However student visas impose several conditions,
including a maximum of 40 hours work per fortnight, and non-failure of courses. These
conditions render SMWs a superexploited workforce, which facilitates a value-transfer
to Australian capital.
SMWs face discriminatory work conditions. They are frequently pushed into low-
skilled jobs, and casual or short-term work. The combination of working hours re-
strictions and financial burden lead to frequent breaches of student visa conditions—
working cash-in-hand, working excessive hours, or failing courses. This leaves SMWs
“teeter[ing] on the edges of legality” (Robertson, 2011: 2195–6), with their residence
conditional on their working hours and pay not being discovered. One well-publicised
case revealed the conditions and pay of 7-Eleven employees—a majority of whom are in-
ternational students (FWO, 2016: 46). The FWO (2016) found a systemic lack of knowl-
edge of work rights, working in excess of visa limitations, falsification of records, unpaid
training, and underpayments. The incident also revealed the systemic nature of student
superexploitation, with over two thirds of the franchises of this major chain implicated
in “payroll compliance issues” (ABC, 2015). Nor is it merely 7-Eleven at fault. One sur-
vey of SMWs in general found 60 per cent of respondents receive lower than minimum
wage and 76 per cent did not receive penalty rates (SSCEE, 2016: 203).
2FWO (2016: 48) estimates SMWs are the largest category of temporary workers (43 per cent) com-
pared to WHMs (33 per cent) and 457-visa holders (24 per cent).
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This superexploitation both enacts, and is founded upon, racist divisions. The bor-
der relation constructs a division between the experiences of domestic and international
students, subjecting SMWs to poor work conditions and pay, limiting or denying access
to welfare, and increasing education fees. But it is also predicated on deeper issues of
discrimination. In a series of interviews, Nyland et al. (2009) found that SMWs have
less social or cultural support to demand decent conditions than domestic students with
cultural knowledge and confidence, and less knowledge of labour rights. Most were em-
ployed by people “of their own cultural group” (Nyland et al., 2009: 8), possibly indicat-
ing differential treatment of migrants based on race in other workplaces. Some report
experiencing overtly bigoted verbal abuse. Many SMWs described a general hostility
directed towards them and differential treatment based on language or appearance
(Nyland et al., 2009: 8–10).3 The border relation’s ongoing construction of the experi-
ence and conditions of SMWs is intimately bound up with concrete divisions between
students, both relying on and propagating the conditions of racism.
These divisions between international and domestic student workers has led to the
diversion of class sentiment. One CFMEU official spoke against migrants working in
“low-paid jobs at convenience stores and driving cabs”, claiming “that’s not a good out-
come for anyone” (Bita, 2013). But rather than call for an extension of student working
rights, the CFMEU called for inquiries into further restrictions on those rights, such as
decreasing the allowed working hours from 20 hours per week. The CFMEU (2015: 12)
argues that international students are “inherently more susceptible to exploitation” due
to language, culture, and age. But these conditions of superexploitation presuppose the
structures of racial division, which are a process that can be challenged, not an object
to be accepted. Thompson and Rosenzweig (2011: 65) argue that the National Union
of Students partook in similar divisions, in calling for a raise in the income require-
ments for international student visas. These moves indicate that the divisions imposed
through the border allow for a diversion of class sentiment into anti-migrant sentiment,
with unions calling for reductions in worker rights in some cases.
SMWs also subsidise the education of other students through high student fees, sav-
ing the Australian state further education outlays for future workers. Student migrants
have turned from a small diplomatic program, to an important source of education fi-
nance. There has been deregulation in student numbers from the beginning of interna-
tional student migration in 1951, through to the removal of caps in 1985, with almost
3Interestingly, students frequently denied that this treatment constituted discrimination.
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a quarter of students today coming from overseas (Burke, 2014: 2; Mares, 2016: 39;
SPERL, 2009: 10). There has been a corresponding increase in fees from their intro-
duction in 1979, gradually increased to full course fees in 1985 (SPERL, 2009: 9–10).
Since 1982, education exports have grown at an average of 14 per cent per annum, and
have become Australia’s third largest export (SPERL, 2009: 19). Student migrants pro-
vide not only value-transfer to capital in terms of their skills, but also subsidise the
education of other workers.
Many SMWs transition into PR. This both transfers value to Australian capital,
and encourages international student migration. This has become successively easier,
with international students granted bonus points granted for PR in 1998, and easing
the transition to other visas in 2001 (Robertson, 2011: 2194; Spinks & Koleth, 2016;
Stratton, 2009: 6). In 2004 over a third of graduating students transitioned to visas
leading to permanent residence (B. Birrell, 2006: 60). Singh et al. (2010: 21) argue this
has allowed the state to produce ideal “designer migrants” who come, pay for their own
education, and then are permitted to stay only should they fulfil the requirements of
capital through the permanent migration program. The student migrant visa allows
capital to gain skilled workers, whilst avoiding reproduction costs.
These changes have been the subject of a racist backlash, characterised by some as
surreptitious back-door entrants. Academic Bob Birrell (2006: 53; Birrell et al., 2007)
wrote several articles bemoaning PR changes and student’s “poor English” abilities.
This received extensive media attention, with newspapers declaring ‘Skilled migration
a rort’, ‘Overseas students fail in job language’ (Baas, 2015). One Nation (2011: 6) de-
scribes international students as “smart foreigners” who are able to get “citizenship
through the back door”.
The extension of work and citizenship rights to student-migrants has also found op-
position amongst the left. One policy move created a 485 visa class, which allowed stu-
dent migrant graduates to stay in Australia and work for four years, extending further
possibility for PR. Doug Cameron—Labor Left Senator and convenor—described the pol-
icy as "diminish[ing] opportunities for young Australians" (cited in Bita, 2013). Some
unions argued against migrants “snatch[ing] jobs from local graduates” (Baas, 2015).
However, there is no evidence for a link between skilled PR and unemployment. This
opposition to migrant rights is one that fails to address underlying structural causes of
unemployment.
SMWs provide a large workforce to capital, and facilitate a large value transfer to
Australian capital. Their limited residential rights in Australia mean they face discrim-
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inatory conditions that both presume and enact racist division of the working class. This
has been a moment in the construction of “common sense” racism through the border.
Working Holidays Makers
Working holiday visas allow tourists aged 18-30 to work and travel in Australia for 12
months (Tan & Lester, 2012: 360). Changes in 2005 allowed the provisioning of a second
12 month visa, provided WHMs worked seasonal jobs in rural areas (Mares, 2016: 37).
The Department of Immigration and Border Protection purports the Working Holiday
Maker (WHM) visa to be “primarily a cultural exchange programme” and therefore not
part of the temporary labour regime aiming to fill labour shortages (DIBP, 2014: 9). It is,
however, very clear that the WHM program provides a huge source of migrant labour.
From 2012-16, the department granted an average of around 337 500 WHM visas per
year.4 A majority of this group—about 85 per cent—engage in paid work during their
stay (Harding & Webster, 2002: 6). The scheme itself explicitly “encourages visa hold-
ers to find short-term or casual work” (Department of Industry, Innovation and Science,
2017), and even directs migrants to rural areas for the second visa. WHMs were in-
stituted in 1975, but expanded out to a larger number of countries and further still
after 2000, student numbers becoming uncapped in the 1990s (Mares, 2002: 47; Shah &
Burke, 2005: 5).
The WHM visa produces a superexploited temporary workforce. Much media atten-
tion is focussed on certain supposedly exceptional cases of particularly low pay rates
and abusive bosses (Mares, 2016: 237). But these stories may disguise the fact that the
conditions come as a result of state policy around visa conditions and the structures
of competition which drives businesses to undercut one another. Though the literature
is small, some evidence is indicative of systemic problems in the conditions of WHMs.
Over a third of WHMs are paid below minimum wage (Tan & Lester, 2012: 368).
Even WHMs have been a site of division. The majority of WHMs are European
(67 per cent), and thus are not the target of racism to the same extent as migrants
coming from Asia.5 None-the-less, there has been negative media attention. Peel and
Steen (2007) find that print media has focussed on conflict between WHMs and domes-
tic Australians, criminal activities, and reckless behaviour, but also attention given to
4Calculated from DIBP (2016a: 25, 2016b: 19) statistics, including first and second visas granted.
5Calculated from DIBP (2016a: 25, 2016b: 19) statistics.
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economic impact of the program and WHMs being victims of crime. There is not suf-
ficient research to conclude whether this may inflate actual incidences. While this is
certainly not to the same level as that for 457 workers or SMWs, there has still been
negative media attention. There have also been anecdotal instances of racial targeting
in the workplace. A Current Affair (2012) interviewed WHMs who reported incidences
of racial abuse, deportation threats, and poor treatment. These instances underlie the
division imposed through the border. Though the rhetoric has been far less divisive,
there have still been tangible divisions in working conditions.
These divisions have also led to a degree of diversion of class sentiment. The CFMEU
(2014: 6) has called for restricted entry to Australia and for reviews into limiting WHM
working rights, on the basis of protecting young Australians. However, evidence sug-
gests that young Australians typically benefit from WHM migration due to the in-
creased demand for services and thus jobs in industries typically dominated by young
people. Tan and Lester (2012) find that every 100 WHMs have a net effect of creating
the equivalent of five full-time jobs.
WHMs provide a temporary reserve army in response to shortages of low-skilled
labour in certain sectors or regions. Employers report that these shortages are due to
the difficult nature of the work, and low pay. Indeed over 80 per cent of employer re-
ported WHMs as important or very important to business, according to one survey (Tan
& Lester, 2012: 375). WHMs thus serve a “critical dependence” of the Agricultural sec-
tor, though only a minority of WHMs are actually employed in regional areas (SSCEE,
2016: 101).
WHMs secure for Australian capital a workforce of superexploited migrants in low-
skilled jobs. Even this predominantly European class has been part of the process of
divisions—constructing and requiring ‘common sense’ racism.
Conclusion
This chapter applied the explanations from chapter two to Australia’s migration pro-
gram, considering permanent migration as well as the three main components of tem-
porary migration—457 visas, student visas, and working holiday visas. But no single ex-
planation was perfectly descriptive of the operation of the border. Between the programs
different explanations dominate. Permanent migration is described well by the reserve
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army explanation. The 457 program is characterised by superexploitation. Student mi-
grants are superexploited, and are particularly used to transfer value to Australian
capital. Working Holiday Makers provide a superexploited reserve army for low-skilled
work. There is no singular and ahistorical scheme that dictates every facet of the border.
The border operates contingently and is driven by various forces.
Abstracting away from specificity however, this has chapter placed the dynamic of
racism at the foundation of the border’s operation. It argued that in each case, not
only does the border perpetuate racism through its twin moments of concrete policy
and rhetorical promulgations, but it also relies on the pre-existence of division by race.
This was also felt in the actions and rhetoric of workers and unions, whose resistance
was channelled away from capital and deployed against migrants. In this way, in its
continual and almost mundane operation, the border enacts and is intimately bound up
with the production of the ‘common sense’ of racial division.
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Why has the Australian state closed its borders to migrants whose labour couldbenefit capital? What factors lie at the heart of the exclusion so dominantthroughout the border?
This thesis has argued that this exclusionary moment of borders is explained at its
deepest level by the importance of racial divisions. Borders are a contradictory relation,
not explained by any unitary description. Australia’s border is varied and multifaceted.
Its different faces serve their own peculiar purposes, developed contingently in time.
The border secures many things for capital. It provides cheap exploitable labour for the
agricultural sector. It delivers high-skilled workers to fuel expansion without the worry
of paying for their education, and draws billions of dollars of student fees to subsidise
the education of the next generation of workers. It produces a workforce with conditions
rendering them liable to systemic mistreatment. But this thesis argues that through all
of these modes of operation, borders have delivered a sweeter benefit yet.
Through the grinding process of its own operation, at once brutal and mundane, the
border has helped secure the hegemonic force of racism. Australia’s border has operated
to divide workers, by concretely imposing racial segregation, and rhetorically imposing
an ideology of racism. It has not just excluded swathes of the world’s population with an
impersonal metric of numbers on a discriminatory points system. It has locked a small
number up on Pacific islands to make the division even clearer. It has imposed divisions
on those entering the country, forming a limited form of residence, and deported many
who fail to fit the schema—all the while deploying racism as a tool which upholds its
own operation.
Moreover, the border’s operation has been drenched in rhetoric identifying migrants
as threats. Whether they were refugees on leaky boats, international students driving
taxis, 457 workers in hospitality, or just workers overseas applying for a visa, the oper-
ation of the border relation has cast migrants as enemies of domestic workers, and cast
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the state as the protagonist protecting Australian workers from them, in a perverse
performance. The policies of government, the rhetoric of politicians, and the reporting
of media have been committed to the production of this peculiar antagonism between
workers.
The border relation has been among the primary drivers in the production of a hege-
mony of racism. It has turned these divisions-in-theory into the common sense of the
working class: of course workers oppose immigration; of course migrants are under-
unionised; of course they get bad pay. It has defined and legitimated the state, welding
workers to capital in the process. And it has redirected workers struggle away from
anywhere it might do harm, instead towards an opposition to foreign workers and their
rights. This ideological function of borders is foundational, underpinning its other func-
tions. For Marx (1870: 221),
“This antagonism is the secret of the impotence of the English working class,
despite its organisation. It is the secret by which the capitalist class main-
tains its power.”
To make this argument, this thesis started with the identification of a contradic-
tion at the base of the border, arguing that theorists had failed to grasp one or both of
its poles: incorporation and exclusion. Theory that relied on inert, lifeless abstraction-
as-object obscured the contradiction, suggesting the path of dialectical abstraction-as-
process. Chapter two thus proposed a Marxian framework of borders, investigating
three interrelated functions of borders. It argued that each was predominated by one
in particular: the function of racist division. On theoretical grounds, racism was pro-
posed as a processual abstraction with which to grasp Australia’s border relation.
In chapters three and four, this understanding was applied in turn to the different
categories of the border relation. Chapter three considered the refugee program in its
profoundly racist cruelty. It argued that refugee policy had been aimed at a domestic
audience, that anti-refugee racism had a systemic effect on Australian capitalism, and
that refugee racism was related to migrant racism. Chapter four applied the categories
of chapter two, and the insights of chapter three, to Australia’s migration program. It
argued that throughout the border was a tendency towards the concrete and rhetorical
division of racism via the production of hegemony. Finally, it argued that the borders
own operation presupposed the racism it helped produce, concluding that the Australian
border’s exclusionary moment is founded on the process of racism.
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This investigation of the Australian border is profoundly relevant to those seeking to
understand it, as well as those seeking to fight the structures it legitimates. This thesis
suggests the value of Marx’s method in comprehending borders, usefully employing it in
the absence of a clear theory of borders. It also contributes the relatively novel concep-
tion of Australia’s border as characterised by a contradiction between incorporation and
exclusion, in an expansive and somewhat ambitious study of Australia’s border relation
as a whole. Australia provides an important example where the contradictory pressures
of borders are at their deepest–some of the deepest in the world in both its exclusionary
and incorporative moments. It may provide a more developed example of tendencies yet
immanent elsewhere. In propounding the border’s role in securing the hegemonic struc-
tures that regulate labour-power, it points not only to the importance of theorising the
structures of racism so intimately bound up with borders, but in challenging them.
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